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Io INTRODUCTION
1.1 The Fliqht Control Scenario
New developments in aviation technology will significantly
improve an aircraft's performance while reducing its operating
cost. Many of the new techniques deteriorate aircraft stability;
to make it flyable by the average pilot, computer based flight
control systems are used to modify its handling characteristics.
A flight control system mates well with the fly by wire concept,
the latter clearing the aircraft of a kluge of cables and pulleys
that previously activated the control surfaces. Some examples of
the new technology are the X29 forward swept wing fighter, an
unstable but highly maneuverable aircraft, and the Boeing 7J7
aircraft, to fly in commercial service in the next decade.
It is typical for a flight control system to have embedded
processors performing the real-time control applications. A
typical configuration contains an input processing subsystem that
captures sensory data, a processor to implement the control laws,
and an output processing subsystem to communicate the computed
commands to the control surfaces. The computers that implement
these control systems have become "flight critical"; that is, if
the flight control system becomes inoperative, the pilot may be
unable to control the aircraft. This differs radically from the
autopilot on previous aircraft - if the autopilot failed, it was
only necessary to revert control to the pilot in an orderly manner.
The FAA requires that the probability of failure for a commercial
aircraft be on the order of 10 .9 per hour of flight. In order to
meet this overall figure, the probability of failure of the flight
control system must be an order of magnitude lower.
It is beyond the state of the art at the present time to
manufacture a single processor with a failure rate this low, even
if one considers only random hardware failures. A state-of-the-art
system composed of a single input subsystem, processor, and output
subsystem would exhibit a mean time to failure of 2000 hours. The
accepted method of constructing a highly reliable system is to use
multiple redundant processors and employ failure logic in such a
manner that, when one processor fails, it is removed from the
system. The remaining processors continue to safely control the
aircraft. It is reasonable to assume that such hardware failures
are independent events, and, if the failure logic and redundancy
management are perfect, then the probability of system failure is
simply the probability of all the processors failing at the same
time. With currently available hardware, between three and four
processors are required to achieve a probability of system failure
of 10 .9. When the failure rate of the actuating system is
considered, it is necessary to increase flight controller
reliability to a probability of failure on the order of 10 "1°.
For a redundant system to operate successfully, the system must
start each flight with all channels operative and fault free. The
channels must be interconnected in such a way that it is possible
to detect and isolate a failure in any channel and reconfigure the
system without that channel. Usually, the outputs of all the
channels are compared, and voting is used to detect and isolate a
failure. However, when the system is operating with only two
channels, a secondary detection means, such as self-test, is used
to detect and isolate failures. Because the system operates in a
dynamic environment, there is a limit to the time that this
reconfiguration process can take. That is, during the
reconfiguration time the aircraft is operating without control;
there is a time after which the aircraft may no longer operate
safely in this state. In the worst case scenario this time is
equal to the length of time the aircraft can survive a hardover on
the control surface.
It is not necessary for each channel to be an autonomous flight
controller. Rather, monitoring may be done at a subsystem level
and the voted output of a subsystem fed forward to the next
redundant level. This adds move voting planes to the system, which
relaxes the requirements of fault detection at each
comparator-monitor. There is no limit to the number of voting
planes that may be added to the system provided that it is
demonstrated that each voting plane detects all the failures of the
subsystems it votes on, and the overall probability of system
failure (including failure of the additional monitoring hardware)
is within acceptable limits.
Many system designs already exist for modularly decomposing a
large avionics system into smaller subsystems that may be
configured in a manner similar to the one just described. In the
past, the processor itself could be partitioned into smaller
modules, with each module containing its own independent redundant
architecture, i.e., multiple replication with a comparator and
voter. The probability of system failure could then be calculated
from hardware considerations only (see, for instance, FTMP [i]).
With the advent of microprocessors into the avionics world, the
partitioning of the processor for monitoring is unfeasible.
Therefore, a system architecture using the processor as a building
block is used. Such an architecture is desirable from an economic
standpoint, and has been studied extensively in the past [2,3].
There is an intuitive appeal to the system designer in placing
the comparator at the processor output because it protects the
control surfaces of the aircraft from receiving erroneous signals.
Because of the complexity of the processor and its complement of
memory devices, it becomes increasingly difficult to show when or
if a single fault within the processor will reach the comparator
and be detected. Under these conditions, it is possible for faults
to accumulate within the processors in such a manner that, when a
particular fault is propagated to the comparators, faults have
occurred in more than one redundant channels. The latency period
of the fault may have allowed a similar fault to occur in another
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channel resulting in premature system failure.
Recapping, in order to demonstrate the required survivability
of an avionics system it is necessary to show that:
- the reliability of each of the redundant hardware modules is
sufficient,
- the pre-flight test insures that all channels are fault-free,
- the voter/monitor detects and isolates all faults,
- secondary detection means detect and isolate faults as required,
- fault isolation time is within required time limits, and
- all faults propagate to a comparator quickly enough so that
latent buildup does not reduce system reliability.
1.2 Latency as a Factor in Hiqhly Reliable Systems
It has been shown by many investigators [4,11,14] that the
predominant cause of failure in highly reliable computing systems
is not through exhaustion of spares. If faults in any portion of
the system are not correctly detected by the failure logic,
recovery will fail. For instance, faults in nonreplicated hardware
may cause incorrect computations and this will not be detectable;
these faults cause single point failures. The probability of
system failure cannot be decreased below that due to single point
failures by adding more spares (unless, of course, the spares make
these single point failures redundant). The inability to detect
all faults within a system is referred to as imperfect coverage,
and the coverage of a system is defined as the probability that a
fault in the system is detected so that proper recovery can occur.
The computation of coverage is complicated by a group of faults
that may or may not be detected depending on the operational state
of the system. Since the state of the system is a complicated
function of its operating environment, one cannot say for sure when
and if these faults will be detected. The time from occurrence to
detection of these faults is called the latency time. When the
latency time of a fault is significant, other mechanisms exist for
system failure to occur:
- a latent fault in one module of a redundant system could combine
with a new fault in a second module of the system to defeat the
comparator, and
- two latent faults can exist in two separate modules of the
system, and a particular state of the environment could activate
them.
In order to properly estimate the probability of system
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failure, it is necessary to associate probabilities with each
mechanism that could cause it to occur. While the above latency
mechanisms are well understood, a practical methodology for
measuring the parameters necessary to compute the probabilities
does not exist.
1.3 Software Errors Modeled as Latent Faults
Designers have gained experience with generic hardware design
problems in existing equipment, and the use of good engineering
techniques has reduced them to an acceptable level. However, the
experience of computer system designers is that software posses a
significantly larger problem in validating error free operation
than its complementary hardware. Reliability analysis is often
based on the premise that the probability of component failure is
random when exposed to the stresses and strains of normal
operation. Moreover, two identical components subject to the same
environment fail independently. However, software failures are not
failures per se. Software never deteriorates with age; rather all
failures result from design errors. In use, these errors are
subject to "random excitation" and result in unpredicted system
response.
To perform a system level reliability analysis, a "probability
of failure" be associated with each software module. It would be
more correct to say that the probability of excitation of existing
latent design errors is required. In this sense, latent design
errors are like latent hardware faults, and it seems reasonable to
explore whether the same techniques can be used to measure software
probability of failure as are being used to measure fault latency
herein.
1.4 Objectives of the Studies
The overall objectives of this work are to provide estimates of
the system characteristics that are necessary to calculate the
probability of system failure due to latency. It would be
desirable to supply both a methodology for measuring latency, and
an estimate of its effects in a typical avionics application.
It is also desirable to measure the probability of failure of
the software embedded in a flight critical piece of hardware using
similar techniques to those used for measuring hardware latency.
1.5 Simulation as a Tool in the Reliability Estimation for Both
Hardware and Software in a Highly Reliable System
To achieve the above objectives, simulations were constructed
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that were appropriate for the type of system being tested (i.e.,
hardware or software). The actual reliability estimation process
consisted of three tasks:
- Markov models must be constructed to relate the probability of
system failure to measurable system characteristics. Markov models
of latent faults were developed, and have been expanded herein.
Markov models of the software modules were also constructed.
- A simulation of the system must be constructed and its
characteristics measured. A fault simulation language called
GGLOSS was developed under NASA funding [15]. GGLOSS is a special
purpose logic simulation program which is gate level and very high
speed. GGLOSS is capable of simulating multiple processors with
different software programs running concurrently. It is envisioned
that GGLOSS will be used to demonstrate the reliability of a flight
control system. While many high quality gate level logic simulator
are available in the marketplace, they cannot be used for this
purpose because:
- they cannot accommodate the number of gates required, and
- their speed of execution is too slow.
The circuit description is presented to GGLOSS in a standard
Partslist format. It is important to emphasize that GGLOSS was
never intended as a circuit design tool. Consequently, it lacks
many of the features normally contained in a commercially available
simulator. It is assumed that the circuit will operate properly in
the unfaulted state.
GGLOSS performs statistical fault analysis of the system. That
is, GGLOSS inserts a number of random faults into the processor
while it executes its software. The results are recorded, and a
postprocessor reports the failure statistics to the user in a
format meaningful for conducting reliability studies.
A separate simulation of the process environment (aircraft
landing, etc.) was constructed for software validation.
- The Markov model must be solved. Models of a simple processor
with simple flight control programs were used to measure system
characteristics that were then used to numerically solve the Markov
models for probability of system failure. Results from simulations
for software validation were used to evaluate software reliability.
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2. THE GGLOSS SIMULATION
2.1 The GGLOSS Simulation Methodology
Examining the faulted behavior of a processing system requires
a simulation methodology that emulates logic network operation. In
addition, statistical techniques are needed to inject faults into
the system in such a manner that the simulation results can be used
to accurately predict failure characteristics of the hardware. The
required methodology was designed by considering:
- a mathematical model of the faults to be considered
The mathematical model for the faults in GGLOSS is a
stuck-at-zero or stuck-at-one fault at each node of a gate level
equivalent circuit of the processing system. The use of pin level
faults was considered in earlier work [6], but the results were too
optimistic to be reliable. That is, the advent of VLSI hides many
of the intermediate nodes of the system within a chip, and these
faults are not tested under pin level assumptions. It also appears
that a fault on an intermediate node is more likely to remain
latent than a fault on a pin.
To model LSI and VLSI circuits, each device is represented by
its manufacturers supplied gate level equivalent circuit.
- a simulation technique that incorporates the faults and
accurately predicts the response of the processing system
The simulation technique used in GGLOSS is parallel fault
simulation. Parallel simulation takes advantage of the fact that
logical operations incorporated in the instruction set of a digital
computer operate independently on each bit of the computer word.
If the simulation is written in such a manner that only boolean
operations are used, then each bit position in the host computer
word can be used to simulate a different version of the same logic
network. Each version finds the response to a different fault. On
a VAX computer, thirty two different faults can be simulated on the
processor at the same time.
To increase the speed of GGLOSS, it is assumed that all
sequential logic being simulated is synchronous and no pulse
generation is allowed. This lack of pulse, or transient, signals
allows GGLOSS to compute only the steady state output of each
combinational network. Modern logic design precludes the use of
asynchronous circuitry.
- a statistical technique for controllinq fault injection and
interpreting the results of the simulation
To obtain failure statistics for the system, a probability of
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occurrence is assigned to each fault in its fault set. The
following rules were utilized for assigning probabilities to gate
level faults:
o The failure rate for each device is obtained from the
applicable military handbook,
o The failure rate of the device is equally distributed over
the gates of the equivalent circuit.
o The failure rate of a gate is equally distributed over the
nodes of that gate.
o Stuck-at-one and stuck-at-zero faults are equally likely.
The probability of occurrence for all the faults in the fault set
is summed to obtain the probability of a fault occurring within the
system.
If every fault is simulated for every possible input, the
conditional detection probabilities of each fault is known. These
detection probabilities can be combined with the probability of
occurrence of each input to obtain overall detection
characteristics for the system, such as fault coverage, latency
time, etc. Often, the number of possible faults is too large to
allow simulation of every one. In this case, Monte Carlo
techniques can be used to obtain approximate results by proceeding
in the following manner:
o Faults are placed in a numerical ordering for selection
purposes
o A cumulative distribution function for the ordering is
generated based on the probability of occurrence of each
fault
o A random number is selected within the range of the
cumulative distribution function
o This number is mapped back through the CDF to a specific
fault
The last two steps in the above process are repeated until a list
of faults is generated. These faults are simulated, and the
results are used to calculate the overall detection characteristics
of the system. The error in a detection characteristic obtained in
this manner depends on the value of the detection characteristic,
the number of faults simulated, and the desired confidence level.
However, calculation of error is straight forward as illustrated in
[6]. When this error is considered unacceptably high, the Monte
Carlo process is repeated for a larger fault sample.
Choice of Simulation Technique
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The behavior of a particular digital network can be checked
under the fault model either analytically, or by one of three fault
modeling techniques.
Analytical techniques require examining the topology of a
network to determine what faults can and cannot be detected at the
output. If the boolean equations describing the network were
available for the unfaulted case and for a faulted case, then they
could be solved in such a way as to predict under what input
conditions the fault could be detected at the network outputs. One
way of doing this is to examine the faulted gate and determine what
values on the input nodes induce a boolean value at the gate output
that is different from the faulted case. The input nodes are then
traced backwards to the network inputs to determine if an input set
exists that induces this gate output. This process is known as
failure excitation. The output of the faulty gate is then traced
to the network output to see if its effects are measurable. This
process is known as path sensitization. If both failure excitation
and path sensitization are present for each failure, then it is
detectable under the proper input vector. An analytic technique
that performs the above calculations on boolean equations is called
the D algorithm.
The general simulation of an electrical circuit involves the
solution of differential equations representing lumped circuit
parameters. Such a simulation will correctly predict both the
steady state and transient behavior of the system. Simulation of
logic circuits is usually simplified by requiring that only the
steady state behavior be simulated. The steady state solution can
be updated after the network has reacted to an input stimulus. Let
the output of every gate represent a state variable of the system.
Then the circuit be represented by a set of simultaneous boolean
difference equations of the form:
Ox(k+l ) = B(I1(k ),I2(k),...,In(k))
where 0 x is the output of gate x at the k+l interval
B is a boolean expression of its arguments
In is the nth input to gate x
The exact form of these equations depends on what additional
assumptions have been made about the circuit.
In the unit delay simulation, it is assumed that each gate
exercises a boolean equation of its inputs, but with a small time
delay (usually on the order of 5-10 nanoseconds, depending on the
logic family). The boolean equations can be iterated on a time
base that represents this unit delay. For a given set of circuit
inputs, the boolean equations are solved on a digital computer
repeatedly until the network reaches an equilibrium or steady state
value, which is the response of the network to these circuit
inputs. As in any iterative solution technique, it is not
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guaranteed that convergence will occur. However, convergence will
occur if the network is feedforward only. It is noted that:
- unit delay simulation correctly predicts that portion of the
transient response that can be represented as a boolean change,
and
- if the network is poorly designed, there is no guarantee that a
steady state solution will be reached.
One disadvantage of unit delay simulation is the amount of
iterations required to reach steady state. Even in a network of N
gates that is feed forward, this can amount to N evaluations of the
entire network, or N2 equations. However, by proper ordering of
the equations, this can be reduced to one evaluation of the network
equations. This ordering will be referred to as a p-ordering.
In many applications, only small portions of the circuit
change boolean value for a given interval of time. The propagation
of such a change is often "blocked" somewhere along the network by
a single gate which feeds forward its previous value even after its
inputs have changed. To take advantage of this phenomenon, one
could retain the previous state outputs of the gates and evaluate
only those gates whose inputs have changed at the beginning of each
iteration. This process is repeated until no inputs to any gates
have changed from the previous iteration, at which time the network
has reached a steady state. The changing of input values for a
gate is referred to as an "event", and this type of simulation is
called event driven simulation. Statistically, most network
simulations result in fewer gate evaluations using this technique.
One disadvantage of the technique is the amount of simulation code
required to do the bookkeeping.
The logical operations indicated by the boolean equations are
performed by computer instructions that operate independently on
each bit of the computer word. If the simulation program is
written in such a manner that boolean operations only are used,
then each bit position in the host computer word can be used to
simulate a different version of the same logic network. However,
each logic network can have a different boolean value on its
inputs. In this manner, the same amount of host computer time can
be used to simulate up to 32 different networks on a VAX host, each
reacting to a different possible set of inputs. Let the presence
of a stuck-at-one, stuck-at-zero fault be modeled as an input to
the system for each gate. Then a large number of faults can be
simulated in a small amount of host time using this method, which
is commonly called parallel fault simulation.
One disadvantage of parallel fault simulation is that it must
be implemented on top of a unit delay simulation, which is often
time inefficient. However, by p-ordering the gates in the
simulation, the parallel simulation can be made very efficient.
GGLOSS was initially designed to be a parallel logic
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simulator. (However, later improvements allow other simulation
techniques to be incorporated into the simulators GGLOSSproduces).
To increase the speed of GGLOSS, it was also assumed that all the
sequential logic being simulated was synchronous, i.e. no
asynchronous pulse generation is allowed. The lack of asynchronous
circuitry allows GGLOSSto compute only the steady state output of
each combinational network ignoring transient response. Modern
logic design precludes the use of asynchronous circuitry.
Most microsequencer controlled logic is designed so that all
flip-flops change state at the same instant of the system clock
cycle. This is usually either the leading or trailing edge of the
clock, and the remainder of the clock cycle time is used for the
logic network to stabilize. GGLOSSworks most efficiently with
this type of logic network by evaluating the boolean logic
equations only once for each clock cycle. This requires some
special treatment of clocking in flip-flops, which occurs within
the flip-flop macros.
Some logic networks which operate synchronously use both the
leading edge of the clock pulse for certain flip-flops to trigger
and the trailing edge of the clock pulse for triggering others. In
the "toy" microprocessor, there were two timing signals that used
the opposite edge of the clock from the rest. This created a
problem for GGLOSS, and two solutions were developed to overcome
it:
- modify the simulation to evaluate all the gates once every
leading clock edge and once every trailing clock edge. This has
the advantage that the user need not concern himself with which
edge a particular flip-flop is triggered. However, it has the
disadvantage that it requires twice as much host CPU time to
execute each simulated clock cycle. The modification to the
simulator requires changing the model of the flip-flop as given in
the BLISS library of logic functions.
- force those flip-flops that are clocked from timing signals on
the opposite edge to be evaluated last. This can be done by using
the "fictitious clock" concept which was mentioned previously. In
this case, the fictitious clock represents a half clock cycle
delay.
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2.2 Some New Features _dded to GGLOSS
The original version of GGLOSS was constructed by J. McGough
and F. Swern at Bendix, and called IGGLOSS. One objective of this
work was to improve IGGLOSS to make it useable for validation
studies. Some improvements that were initially made to IGGLOSS
were:
Automatic Fault Injection
The fault insertion mechanism was modified so that a large
number of randomly chosen faults can be injected, and the simulator
will return fault detection statistics. To accomplish this, the
following changes were made to GGLOSS.
The GGLOSS compiler inserts provisions in the simulation for
faulting every node of every gate in the model. Each prospective
fault is assigned a number, and an index dataset is created that
associates each number with the name of the gate and node it
faults.
The user supplies an input dataset that contains a probability
of failure for each gate type used in the simulation. GGLOSS uses
this data to compute a cumulative probability of failure
distribution for the logic being tested. When GGLOSS is run, it
asks the user how many faults to inject. Faults are then chosen at
random using the cumulative distribution and the random number
generator on the VAX. The list of gates to be faulted is written
out to a dataset. While the BLISS simulation is running, it reads
the list of gates to be faulted, and simulates up to 31 faults. If
more than 31 faults were to be injected, the simulation is repeated
until the fault list is exhausted.
At the end of each simulation run, the name of the fault
simulated is looked up in the 'fault index' dataset and placed in
the detect dataset. A list of faults not detected is also
produced.
Accommodate 32 different ROMS
The simulation was modified to optionally run a single copy of
32 different machines executing in parallel, each running from a
different copy of ROM. Because of the parallel simulation
technique, the machines would be running bit synchronous. In order
for the machines to communicate with one another, a common memory
area can be set up that can be accessed by each machine. A single
fault is injected into one of the machines, and the recovery
mechanism of the system can be tested.
Accommodate multiple faults in a sinqle machine
16
The simulation was modified so that multiple fault situations
might be studied. In this case, a total of 31 faulted machines is
simulated, but two or more faults will be injected per machine. A
prompt from GGLOSSduring compilation of the simulation sets the
number of faults injected per machine.
Specification of Initial Conditions
The user may wish to specify initial conditions for each
simulation. To simplify the process of initialization, GGLOSS
assumes that all initial conditions are zero. The user may then
specify an initial condition of one for the output of any gate(s)
in the simulation.
This is accomplished by prompting while the simulation is
being compiled. The user specifies the name of the output signal
of the gate as given in the partslist. The prompt is repeated over
and over again until the user indicates he is satisfied with the
set of initial conditions.
Extended Test Pin Coveraqe
One output of the GGLOSS simulation is a table of faults
followed by the test points that detect these faults. An entry is
made into this table every clock cycle that the signal at the test
point differs from the nominal case. At the end of the simulation,
a complete fault dictionary has been constructed.
Memory Mapped I/O
One can now simulate inputs and outputs to the outside world,
using memory mapped I/O. The actual values of input signals are
contained in a dataset, one dataset record for each clock cycle
that an IO signal is referenced. It is assumed that the user knows
the proper sequence of input values required for each particular
experiment a priori. An output signal is considered to be a
monitoring point, and any deviation in output between different
machines is recorded as detection of the failure.
Shared Memory
When GGLOSS is used to simulate a redundant processor complex,
each group of processors can communicate with one another through
shared memory. The shared memory is available to all the
processors in the complex so that processor interaction and
software monitoring and recovery can be simulated.
Intermittent Faults
An intermittent fault model was be developed and programmed
into the simulation. This particular fault model allows two types
of intermittent faults: single incident and cyclic. In the cyclic
fault model, the user specifies the frequency and duration of
intermittency. In the single incident model, the user specifies
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the starting and ending clock cycle of the fault.
Expand Library of Bliss Coded Primitives
This task involved using a catalog of MSI and LSI logic to
expand the GGLOSS primitive library to include most of the commonly
available blocks used in logic design.
Faults in RAM
This task involves modifying the RAM model so that stuck at
faults can be simulated. One may currently inject faults in RAM by
specifying the word address, bit number, and stuck-at-one or stuck
at zero. A dataset is supplied to GGLOSS which describes the
memory locations to be faulted.
Tasks to be Modified or not to be Undertaken
The initial plans for modifying IGGLOSS contained items which
were later modified as new directions in the development of GGLOSS
as a simulator were planned:
Network Partitioning
A parallel fault simulation of a processor contains a large
number of prospective gates to be faulted. However, the procedure
only allows 31 different gates to be faulted each time the
simulator is run. In the Bendix BDX930 simulator, simulation time
was reduced significantly by dividing the processor into four
partitions. Four different simulators were constructed, each
allowing only one quarter of the processors gates to be faulted.
After a large number of faults were selected, they were sorted into
groups corresponding to the partitions. By running each group on
its corresponding simulator, the correct results were obtained at
a significant savings in execution time.
Discussions with RTI at Langley indicate that future
development of the simulator would change the fault simulation
mechanism used in the simulator. In the new technique, every gate
would contain a unconditional branch statement that would bypass
fault simulation. Memory modification techniques would be used to
change the unconditional branch statements for those gates that are
faulted. The advantage of this technique is lower overhead in the
fault injection process.
Because of the lower overhead in the new technique, there is
little to be gained by partitioning the network as described above.
Therefore, this task is being held in abeyance pending future
decisions on the fault simulation mechanism to be used.
Multiple Fictitious Clocks
The original role of the fictitious clock was to force the
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evaluation order of the logic. Multiple fictitious clocks was
supposed to allow different clock periods to be used within the
simulation.
Many of the problems in getting the simulator to operate
correctly with the model of a processor centered around the use of
fictitious clocks. It was easier building a circuit model without
them. However, they were useful in simulating a half clock cycle
delay.
It is unclear at this point what fictitious clocks will be
used for in the simulation. However, some thought will be given to
the problem of how circuit timing (i.e., half cycle delays, etc.)
can be properly simulated.
Fault Collapsinq
This task requires comparing faults in a large fault list and
deciding which faults have exactly the same effect on the network.
This would be done from the topology of the network. Once a list
of equivalent faults has been found, each equivalency group need be
simulated only once. In a large combinatory network, this can
represent a considerable savings in execution time. However, more
work is needed to synthesize the algorithm to do this, and work on
this task is continuing.
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2.3 Processinq Systems DQsc_ibed Across Multiple SDL Files
One problem with the IGGLOSS version of GGLOSS was that an
entire processing system had to be described as a single module
using a single SDL file. In systems containing a large number of
logic gates, this was cumbersome and severely stressed the storage
capacity of the GGLOSS program. A better approach is a modular
one, breaking the simulation down into different SDL files and
allowing GGLOSS to translate each SDL file separately. In the
current version of GGLOSS, large processing systems may be
represented in this manner.
Decomposition into modules is very natural to digital design,
as digital systems are built hierarchically from chips into boards,
and boards into systems. It is possible for a VLSI chip to be
modeled by a software module and used multiple times within the
simulation. The chip's pinout gives the signals that cross the
module boundaries. In other cases, partitioning occurs solely due
to module size, and choosing signals to cross module boundaries
is not as natural as using a chip's pinout.
Each module is represented by a separate SDL file, and is
compiled by GGLOSS into a separate BLISS program. To construct a
modular simulator, it is the responsibility of the user to supply
the appropriate SDL files to GGLOSS, including:
- at the top of the hierarchy, a single SDL file that describes
the system using partitions, chips, and gates to be described in
lower levels,
- additional SDL files to describe partitions of the system using
both gates and lower level modules as required,
- any additional SDL files describing modules at lower levels,
- a library of primitives representing gates (same as the old
GGLOSS library file), and
- sufficient gate failure statistics for GGLOSS to compute the
failure rate of a module, and all modules in the hierarchy.
An example of a modularly constructed simulation is given in Figure
2.3.1.
CONNECTIVITY OF MODULES
There is a caveat in this partitioning process when working
with parallel simulations. In the parallel method of simulation,
the ordering of statement execution is extremely important. When
GGLOSS works with a single SDL file describing a large system, its
"P - ordering" algorithm almost always assemble a simulation module
that will work properly when there are no feedback loops in the
system. However, partitioning implies that GGLOSS cannot easily
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"shuffle the statements from different modules" to find this
correct ordering, and a poor partitioning may result in an unusable
simulator. When this occurs, there will be no correct "P -
ordering" of the higher level modules. GGLOSScan help the user by
giving diagnostic information to help pinpoint which submodules or
gates it is having trouble ordering.
Consider first how the user would handle this partitioning
problem. One solution would be to break every module down into a
number of submodules such that the interconnection characteristics
of the submodules guarantees the existence of an overall ordering
for the system. A possible technique would be to translate each
module into BLISS using GGLOSSand note what problems GGLOSShas in
"P - ordering" the module. Modules which GGLOSS has trouble
ordering can then be broken down into smaller submodules, and the
process repeated until a good simulator is built.
It seems desirable to solve the problem within GGLOSS, rather
than hand it to the user. GGLOSSmust examine the topology of each
module, and determine the number of submodules that are required.
In this case, all the submodules will be contained in a single
BLISS module, existing as subsections of that module. The BLISS
code would contain a variable indicating which submodule the caller
wishes to execute. For "P - ordering" purposes, higher level
GGLOSS routines treat the single BLISS module as separate
submodules, and generate calls indicating which submodule to
execute.
To develop the topological algorithms, let the inputs to a
module be represented by a binary vector I and the outputs be
represented by a binary vector O. Then there exists a binary
transfer matrix T that relates the circuit outputs to the circuit
inputs, i.e.,
O = T I.
Each element of T represents a boolean transfer function between a
particular input and a particular output. The exact values of the
elements of matrix T are not of interest, only whether or not the
element is a logical zero. A matrix T' is constructed by
substituting logical ones in matrix T for nonzero transfer
elements, and T' represents the connectivity of the module. An
example of the T' matrix is given in Figure 2.3.2. If all the
elements of T' are nonzero, then there is nothing further that can
be done to break this module into submodules, since each output
requires the knowledge of all the inputs for its computation.
When some of the elements of a specific row are zero, its
corresponding output can be computed without knowing the values of
those inputs whose columns contain the zeroes. Hence, each row in
T' which contains a different pattern is a candidate for a separate
submodule. The construction of the submodules and the order of
their call must be such that the proper evaluation of the module
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occurs; however, this can be ascertained using the "P - ordering"
algorithm as it already exists.
MODULE DATA FILES
When GGLOSS compiles a module from SDL into BLISS, it generates
a file containing data about the module. This file contains:
- the name of the module,
- the number and values of any initial conditions on the module,
- the number of memory elements in the module,
- the failure rate of the module and a cumulative fault
distribution among all the gates of the module,
- detection points within the module,
- whether the input pins are in common or passed as parameters,
and
- the template of the calling statement including the order of the
arguments.
This file is created in the GDAT: area of disk and has the file
extension of .FTB.
The file has three uses:
- Computinq the qate level equivalent of hiqher level modules
In order to properly compile a multi-module simulation, modules
must be compiled working up the hierarchy chain. Each succeeding
level of the hierarchy requires information about lower levels;
specifically, the calling template of all lower level modules and
their gate level equivalents. The gate level equivalent and its
cumulative failure rate for each module is read directly from the
FTB file.
- Generatinq complex simulations without recompilinq each module
In order to avoid recompiling all modules each time the
simulator is rebuilt, the INCLUDE command can be used to read the
required data from the FTB file. This is convenient and time
saving if a library of VLSI chips is built to be used in
constructing complicated network simulations.
- Generatinq new fault simulation lists without recompilinq the
simulation
In the Monte Carlo environment, it may be desired to run the
simulator again with a different random selection of faults. This
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can easily be done by INCLUDEing the highest level module and
generating a new faults set with the FLTGEN command.
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$ R GLOSS
GLOSS>
COMPILE GDAT: JEANXI. SDL, FAULT
TOTAL NUMBER OF FAULTS IS 906
14 COMPONENTS IN THE FAILURE RATE TABLE,
FAILURE RATE FOR THE MODULE IS 1.3111077E-08
NUMBER OF STATEMENTS = 132
GLOSS>
COMPILE GDAT: JEANX2. SDL, FAULT
TOTAL NUMBER OF FAULTS IS 376
14 COMPONENTS IN THE FAILURE RATE TABLE,
FAILURE RATE FOR THE MODULE IS 5.1111111E-08
NUMBER OF STATEMENTS = 61
GLOSS>
COMPILE GDAT :JEANX3. SDL, FAULT
TOTAL NUMBER OF FAULTS IS 410
14 COMPONENTS IN THE FAILURE RATE TABLE,
FAILURE RATE FOR THE MODULE IS 6.5111112E-09
NUMBER OF STATEMENTS = 67
GLOSS>
COMPILE GDAT: JEANXT. SDL, FAULT, TABLE=GDAT :TOYFAIL. DAT
TOTAL NUMBER OF FAULTS IS 1692
14 COMPONENTS IN THE FAILURE RATE TABLE,
FAILURE RATE FOR THE MODULE IS 2.4733000E-08
NUMBER OF STATEMENTS = 4
GLOSS>
MEMORY RAM, TYPE=RAM, ADDBITS=8, -
GLOSS>
DATABITS=8, INIT=GDAT" TOY. MEM, FAULT, LENGTH=32
GLOSS>
BIND TOY, CYCLES=300, PRINT
A Modularly Constructed Simulation
Figure 2.3.1
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2.4 Simulation of Functional Blocks
GGLOSS is capable of simulating up to 32 different faults
within the same parallel run. In practice, one of the parallel
executing simulations is always the good system, acting as a
reference to determine when fault detection occurs. This means
that 31 different faults are being evaluated during each simulation
run on a VAX machine. The fault set of even a small processor
contains more than ten thousand faults - most of which are not
active during a given simulation run. Thus, a large portion of the
logic is running "true-value"; that is, it is not simulating
faults, but rather propagating the results of faults occurring in
other logic gates.
Unfortunately, gate level logic simulation does not efficiently
simulate this propagation phenomena. In most cases it is faster to
functionally characterize portions of the logic that are unfaulted.
For instance, it may take a hundred statements to simulate an ALU
chip at the gate level while it takes only a few statements to
functionally describe the chip. When a functional simulation of
a module executes significantly faster than the equivalent gate
level simulation, there may be a decrease in GGLOSS execution time
by including that functional module. The objective of this portion
of the study was to develop a methodology that would allow
simulations to be constructed consisting of a combination of
modules described functionally and at the gate level. In addition
to decreased simulation time, there are other advantages of the
functional simulation technique:
- ability to use a simplified description of peripheral hardware,
ability to debug large simulations using simplified functional
descriptions of hardware not yet simulated at the gate level,
and
- ability to include environmental and analog simulations.
CONSTRUCTION OF FUNCTIONAL LEVEL MODULES
Functional level modules are constructed using the following
groundrules:
- functional level modules simulate input/output relationships
only
Functional level modules use the same pinout signals as gate
level modules, but they need only simulate the functional
relationship between the pins. This means that the internals of
the module can be simplified in such a way as to reduce the amount
of necessary computation, as long as it produces the correct answer
at the output pins. However, to construct such simplification
requires an individual to examine the circuit in each module and
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synthesize a "custom" subroutine representing that module.
- functional level modules simulate one version of the network
onlM
Functional level modules do not utilize parallel simulation,
and therefore simulate one version of the network only. Thus, a
functional level module must be called once for each active version
in the parallel simulation. To correctly keep track of the
different versions, the functional level module is passed a state
storage array to store all the results of computation for this
version. The same functional module can be called repeatedly in a
loop to simulate all the active versions of the system as long as
the calling module changes the state storage array it passes with
each call.
- functional level modules may contain analog simulations
Functional level modules may contain continuous differential
equations simulated in the standard manner, i.e. using any of the
well known integration techniques such as Eulerian integration,
Runge-Kutta, etc. These modules share in common with the control
routines a time base which is used to synchronize any analog
simulation with logic simulation.
SIMULATION ARCHITECTURE WITH FUNCTIONAL MODULES
To make the maximum use of functional computation, all modules
but one are modeled at the functional level while the remaining
module is modeled at the gate level using parallel simulation.
Faults are injected at the gate level in the latter module only.
An interface routine is provided that translates from the
functional level output to gate level input, and back again.
Often it is not necessary for functional modules to be executed
thirty two times to represent the thirty two versions being
simulated. If a fault does not manifest itself by propagating to
the output of the parallel module, then its functional state is the
same as that of the unfaulted version. Even when a fault
propagates to the output of the parallel module, its functional
state may be the same as another fault being simulated which
presents the same outputs from the parallel module. Faults which
have shared the same functional state from the start of the
simulation until a particular time will be termed equivalent, for
they manifest themselves in exactly the same manner outside the
faulted circuitry within that time frame.
Equivalent faults are modeled by a single execution of the
functional modules. At the start of a simulation run, there is
exactly one equivalence class for all faults including the
unfaulted network since faults have not yet manifest themselves.
As the simulation continues, the outputs of the parallel module are
tested for a pattern that indicates a new equivalence class. When
a new equivalence class is found, a new functional "machine" is set
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up, copying the state storage array from the "machine" that spawned
it. This process continues, spawning new machines as required.
However, when a fault is successfully detected, the machine
representing its equivalence class is terminated. At any instant,
the simulation must execute its functional modules as many times as
there are active equivalence classes. The process is shown
diagrammatically in Figure 2.4.1.
The logistics of simulating faulted machines is simplified by
storing a fault mask for each equivalence class. A one in a
particular bit position indicates that the parallel fault
represented by this bit position is part of this equivalence class.
Initially, the simulation starts out with one equivalence class and
a fault mask of all ones. The fault mask is used to pack the input
words to the parallel module from the outputs of the functional
modules, i.e., when the functional machine for a particular
equivalence class has an output of one to be input to the parallel
module, its fault mask is ored into the appropriate parallel module
input word. On return from the parallel module, each output is
checked against the fault mask for each equivalence class - if all
the bits that are one in the fault mask are the same (all either
one or zero) in the output, then execution proceeds. If some of
the bits that are one in the fault mask are mixed in the output,
then a new machine is spawned. The procedure is shown in Figure2.4.2.
TESTING OF FUNCTIONAL LEVEL SIMULATION
Functional level simulation was tested by implementing the ALU
portion of the toy processor as a functional module. A partial
listing of the module is shown in Figure 2.4.3. An interface
module was constructed in BLISS that performed the checking and
spawning operations described above, and is shown in Figure 2.4.4.
Another FORTRAN module was programmed to keep track of both the
average number of equivalence classes that existed in the
simulation and the high water mark. The results of running this
simulation is shown in Figure 2.4.5.
The functions performed by the ALU in the toy processor were
simple to program. However, constructing and debugging the
interface code in both BLISS and FORTRAN occupied much of the
development time for this task. It was concluded that most of this
code could have been generated by GGLOSS, and development of this
capability should be part of the next contract period.
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C
SUBROUTINE FTALU(CCLK,CCLR,MDO,MDI,MD2,MD3,MD4,MD5,MD6,MD7,ENBL,
I ADDSUB,CNMI,ALUOY,ALUIY,ALU2Y,ALU3Y,ALU4Y,ALU5Y,ALU6Y,ALU7Y,
2 ALU71,ALU72,ALU7Q,ALU7QB,CSTEP,STATE)
FUNCTIONAL SIMULATION OF TOY ALU
IMPLICIT INTEGER*4 (A-Z)
DIMENSION STATE(100)
IF (CSTEP.EQ.0) THEN
MD=0
IF(MDO.LT.0) MD=MD+I
IF(MDI.LT.0) MD=MD+2
IF(MD2.LT.0) MD=MD+4
IF(MD3.LT.0) MD=MD+8
IF(MD4.LT.0) MD=MD+I6
IF(MD5.LT.0) MD=MD+32
IF(MD6.LT.0) MD=MD+64
IF(MD7.LT.0) MD=MD-128
STATE(5)=CCLK
STATE(6)=CCLR
IF (ADDSUB.EQ.O) THEN
STATE(2)=MD
ELSE
STATE(2)=-MD-I
ENDIF
IF (CNMI.LT.0) THEN
STATE(3)=STATE(1)+STATE(2)+I
ELSE
STATE(3)=STATE(1)+STATE(2)
ENDIF
IF (ENBL.LT.0) THEN
STATE(4)=STATE(1)
ELSE
STATE(4)=-1
ENDIF
ELSE
IF (STATE(5).LT.0) STATE(1)=STATE(3)
IF (STATE(6).EQ.0) STATE(1)=0
ENDIF
Example of a Functional Level Module
Figure 2.4.3
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IF(BTEST(STATE(4),0)) THEN
ALUOY--1
ELSE
ALUOY-0
ENDIF
IF(BTEST(STATE(4),I)) THEN
ALUIY--I
ELSE
ALUIY-O
ENDIF
IF(BTEST(STATE(4),2)) THEN
ALU2Y=-I
ELSE
ALU2Y=O
ENDIF
IF(BTEST(STATE(4),3)) THEN
ALU3Y=-I
ELSE
ALU3Y=0
ENDIF
IF(STEST(STATE(4),4)) THEN
ALU4Y=-I
ELSE
ALU4Y=O
ENDIF
IF(BTEST(STATE(4),5)) THEN
ALU5Y=-I
ELSE
ALU5Y=0
ENDIF
IF BTEST(STATE(4),6)) THEN
ALU6Y=-I
ELSE
ALU6Y=0
ENDIF
IF(BTEST(STATE(4),7)) THEN
ALU7Y=-I
ELSE
ALU7Y=0
ENDIF
IF(BTEST(STATE(3),7}) THEN
ALU71--I
ELSE
ALU71=0
ENDIF
IF(BTEST(STATE(2),7)) THEN
ALU72=-I
ELSE
ALU72=O
ENDIF
Example of a Functional Level Module
( Continued )
Figure 2.4.3
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MODULE FUNCTION(ADDRESSING_MODE(EXTERNAL = LONG_RELATIVE,
NONEXTERNAL = LONG_RELATIVE)) =
BEGIN
!
GLOBAL ROUTINE TOYALU(II,12,I3,I4,IS,I6,I7,IS,Ig,II0,III,
II2,II3,OI,O2,O3,O4,O5,O6,O7,OS,O9,OI0,OII,OI2,J,K) : NOVALUE =
!
! NAME: FUNCTIONAL INTERFACE ROUTINE
!
! PURPOSE: INTERFACES BETWEEN GGLOSS PARALLEL GATE LEVEL SIMULATOR
! AND BLOCKS WRITTEN AT FUNCTIONAL, NONPARALLEL LEVEL
!
! INPUTS:
!
! OUTPUTS:
!
! DESCRIPTION:
!
!
BEGIN
MACRO CHECKIN(INPUT) =
X = .INPUT AND .MASK[.I];
IF (.X NEQ O) AND (.X NEQ .MASK[.I]) THEN
(NMASK = .NMASK + i;
MASK[.NMASK] = .X;
MASK[.I] = .MASK[.I] AND NOT .X;
INCR L FROM 0 TO 99 DO FSTATE[100*.NMASK+.L]=.FSTATE[100*.I+.L];
EXITLOOP);%;
OWN I, REG, JMASK, OOi,O02,IIl,II2,II3,II4,II5,II6,II7,IIS,II9,IIlO,
IIll, II12, II13,OO3,OO4,OO5,006 ,OO7,008 ,OO9,OO10,OO11, OO12, X, L,
MONE ;
OWN
FSTATE: VECTOR[ 3200],
MASK: VECTOR[32],
NMASK ;
EXTERNAL ROUTINE FTALU : FORTRAN;
EXTERNAL ROUTINE PRI : FORTRAN;
EXTERNAL ROUTINE CNTF : FORTRAN;
REQUIRE 'GDAT:BLISCOM.R32';
IF .IGOP EQL 1 THEN
(NMASK=0; MASK[0] = -I; STOPMASK = -I; INCR I FROM 0 TO 3199 DO
FSTATE[.I]=0;IGOP=0; MONE = -i; CNTF(MONE,MONE););
Example of a Functional Level Interface Routine
Figure 2.4.4
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JMASK - 0;
INCR I FROM 0 TO .NMASK DO
(MASK[.I]-.MASK[.I] AND .STOPMASK;
IF .MASK[.I] NEQ 0 THEN JMASK - .JMASK + I;);
CNTF(JMASK,NMASK);
DO BEGIN
JMASK - .NMASK ;
INCR I FROM 0 TO .NMASK DO
BEGIN
CHECKIN(.II);
CHECKIN(.I2);
CHECKIN(.I3);
CHECKIN(.I4};
CHECKIN(.I5);
CHECKIN(.I6);
CHECKIN(.I7);
CHECKIN(.I8);
CHECKIN(.I9);
CHECKIN(.IIO);
CHECKIN(.Ill);
CHECKIN(.II2);
CHECKIN(.II3};
END;
END
UNTIL .JMASK EQL .NMASK ;
.O1 - O; .02 = O; .03 = 0; .04 - 0; .05 = 0; .06 = O; .07 = O; .08 = 0;
.09 - 0; .O10 - 0; .Oll - O; .O12 - O;
INCR I FROM 0 TO .NMASK DO
IF .MASK[.I] NEQ 0 THEN
BEGIN
IIl= (IF (.MASK[.I] AND
II2 = (IF (.MASK[.I] AND
II3 = (IF (.MASK[.I] AND
II4 = (IF (.MASE[.I] AND
II5 = (IF (.MASK[.I] AND
II6 - (IF (.MASK[.I] AND
II7 - (IF (.MASK[.I] AND
118 - (IF (.MASK[.I] AND
II9 - (IF (.MASK[.I] AND
IIl0 - (IF (.MASK[.I] AND
IIll - (IF (.MASK[.I] AND
II12 - (IF (.MASK[.I] AND
II13 - (IF (.MASK[.I] AND
If) NEQ 0 THEN -i ELSE 0);
I2) NEQ 0 THEN -1 ELSE 0);
I3) NEQ 0 THEN -I ELSE 0);
I4) NEQ 0 THEN -I ELSE 0);
I5) NEQ 0 THEN -1 ELSE 0);
I6) NEQ 0 THEN -I ELSE 0);
I7) NEQ 0 THEN -1 ELSE 0);
I8) NEQ 0 THEN -1 ELSE 0);
I9) NEQ 0 THEN -I ELSE 0};
.I10) NEQ 0 THEN -I ELSE 0);
.I11) NEQ 0 THEN -i ELSE 0);
.I12) NEQ 0 THEN -i ELSE 0);
.I13) NEQ 0 THEN -1 ELSE 0);
FTALU(IIl,II2,II3,II4,II5,II6,II7,IIB,II9,1110,IIll,II12,II13,
OO1,OO2,OO3,OO4,OO5,OO6,OO7,OO8,OO9,OO10,OO11,OO12,
CSTEP,FSTATE[100*.I]);
.O1 -
.02 =
.03 z
.O4 =
.05 s
.06 =
.07
.O8 =
.09 =
•O1 OR (.OO1 AND .MASK
•O2 OR (.OO2 AND .MASK
•O3 OR (.OO3 AND .MASK
•O4 OR (.OO4 AND .MASK
•O5 OR (.OO5 AND .MASK
•O6 OR (.OO6 AND .MASK
•O7 OR (.OO7 AND .MASK
•O8 OR (.OO8 AND .MASK
•O9 OR (.OO9 AND .MASK
.I]);
.I]);
.1]);
.I));
.I]);
.I]);
.1]);
.I]);
.I]);
Example of a Functional Level
( Continued )
Figure 2.4.4
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$ RUN GSIM:EXEC
ELAPSED: 0 00:00:41.00 CPU: 0:00:16.94
TOTAL CYCLES WAS 600
HIGH WATER MARK MACHINES WAS 1
AVERAGE NUMBER OF MACHINES WAS 1.000000
ELAPSED: 0 00:00:42.94 CPU: 0:00:17.17
TOTAL CYCLES WAS 600
HIGH WATER MARK MACHINES WAS 2
AVERAGE NUMBER OF MACHINES WAS 1.998333
ELAPSED: 0 00:00:42.91 CPU: 0:00:16.94
TOTAL CYCLES WAS 600
HIGH WATER MARK MACHINES WAS 2
AVERAGE NUMBER OF MACHINES WAS 1.9988333
ELAPSED: 0 00:00:39.77 CPU: 0:00:16.08
TOTAL CYCLES WAS 600
HIGH WATER MARK MACHINES WAS 2
AVERAGE NUMBER OF MACHINES WAS 1.9988333
ELAPSED: 0 00:00:44.34 CPU: 0:00:16.54
TOTAL CYCLES WAS 600
HIGH WATER MARK MACHINES WAS 5
AVERAGE NUMBER OF MACHINES WAS 2.275000
ELAPSED: 0 00:00:44.46 CPU: 0:00:17.39
TOTAL CYCLES WAS 600
HIGH WATER MARK MACHINES WAS 8
AVERAGE NUMBER OF MACHINES WAS 2.335002
ELAPSED: 0 00:00:43.49 CPU: 0:00:17.49
TOTAL CYCLES WAS 600
HIGH WATER MARK MACHINES WAS 8
AVERAGE NUMBER OF MACHINES WAS 2.348333
BUFIO: 304
BUFIO: 304
BUFIO: 303
BUFIO: 304
BUFIO: 305
BUFIO: 304
BUFIO: 303
DIRIO: 12
DIRIO: 14
DIRIO: i0
DIRIO: 14
DIRIO: 15
DIRIO: 15
DIRIO: I0
FAULTS
FAULTS
FAULTS
FAULTS
FAULTS
FAULTS
FAULTS
468
125
0
0
0
0
Performance Results for a Single Functional Level Subroutine
Figure 2.4.5
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2.5 Simulation of Memor 7 Blocks
Processors and sequencers to be simulated with GGLOSS contain
a number of memory elements such as PROM used to contain microcode,
PROM used to contain program code, RAM used as scratchpad, and
memory mapped I/O. The previous GGLOSS memory simulation was
inadequate in simulating all these different memories, and this
situation was addressed by an improved memory block simulation
technique. The GGLOSS memory simulation now allows the
construction of twenty (an arbitrary number which can be increased)
different memory chips with a variety of characteristics that
allows enough flexibility to simulate practical processors.
Memories are handled on a functional basis, allocating VAX
storage for either read only or read/write memory. The former is
allocated only once; the same copy is read by each of the thirty
two different machines. The latter is allocated thirty-two times
so that each machine can have its own copy of RAM to modify as
necessary. It is noted that there is no attempt to model memory at
any lower level, such as static vs. dynamic, and/or including
memory cycle timing. It was concluded that this type of simulation
would be desirable in many cases; however, it is best modeled by
using gate level logic to simulate the timing and then interface
the processing system to the functional simulation included in
GGLOSS.
Other features that have been retained in the memory
simulation:
- Multiple processors may be simulated by neighboring bit
positions on the VAX communicating through common memory.
Only a portion of ROM and/or RAM need be simulated to conserve
space in large memory simulations. Failures which result in
access to unsimulated portions of the memory will return a word
of all ones.
- Both ROM and RAM can be initialized.
Memory mapped inputs are simulated by subroutine, and may either
be linked to functional blocks or read a dataset containing
input values.
Memory mapped outputs are now detection addresses which may be
used in the same manner as detect pins to initiate post-
processing.
A single memory chip may contain ROM, RAM and memory mapped I/O.
This feature allows simplified simulation of processor operation
without simulating the memory mapping logic.
- Both ROM and RAM memory may be selectively faulted by chip. ROM
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faults randomly invert bits in memory while RAM faults are of
the stuck-at-one, stuck-at-zero variety.
Memories are simulated in SDL using the MEMR primitive.
However, the partsname for the memory is an eight character name
that is used to reference that memory at simulation time. The
GGLOSSMEMORYdirective, described in the appendix, is used to
associate memory attributes with memory chips using the partsname
association. MEMORYalso creates an initialization program to
handle ROMloading.
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2.6 Improvinq The GGLOSS Architecture for Other Simulation
Methodoloqies
One design objective of GGLOSS was to produce a package that
would simulate gate level hardware level with faults at speeds high
enough so that phenomena such as fault latency could be studied.
Parallel simulation methodology was chosen for maximum speed with
faulted logic. Further, GLOSS reads a description of the logic
under test and compiles a computer program that simulates that
logic. However, after implementing GGLOSS, it soon became apparent
that GGLOSS should be expanded to support more complex simulations
including simulation modes other than parallel.
To accomplish this, building a simulation with GGLOSS was
reorganized into a two stage process: -
o Build a P-ordered sequence of macro calls that represent the
logic to be simulated. The translation process consists of three
steps:
- Generate data declarations for every logic signal in the
circuit being simulated.
- P-order the SDL description of the logic into an ordered list
of simulation "blocks".
- Translate each simulation block into a macro sequence that
describes its operation in a "neutral format".
o Translate the macro sequence into a target language for the
simulation engine. This process also consists of three steps:
- Read in a macro definition file that expands each macro
sequence generated above into a target language for
simulation.
- Expand the macro sequences for each simulation block.
- Compile the tables required for table driven algorithms.
The above process was implemented, and shows many advantages over
previous GGLOSS implementations. It allows GGLOSS to run on a
variety of different computers, using a variety of different
simulation languages, using a variety of different simulation
techniques. More specifically, the languages GGLOSS can produce
simulators for might include:
o BLISS
o FORTRAN
o C
o PASCAL
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o Assembly Language
while the types of simulators that might be produced are:
o Parallel
o Event Driven
o Deductive
o Concurrent
The flexibility of GGLOSSshould be apparent: GGLOSScan produce an
optimum simulator for each situation with a minimum of effort on
the part of the GGLOSSuser.
To illustrate how the GGLOSSworks, Figure 2.6.1 shows the
output of the first stage of building a simulation while Figure
2.6.2 shows the macro definitions for the second stage that
produces a FORTRANparallel simulator. The next two sections
describe how GGLOSS constructs Event Driven and Deductive
simulators.
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$MODULE I 0 REGS
$MEXTNM MPSNEW
SMEXTNM ALU
$MEXTNM ALULATCH
SMEXTNM CNTRSTOR
SMEXTNM CS REG
$MEXTNM IC AD RG
$MEXTNM MAINSTOR
SMEXTNM MAPSTORE
SMEXTNM GP REGS
SMEXTNM TEMPREGS
$MEXTNM TI750A
$ROUTINE I O REGS
$REND
SEXTERN2 IINJECTOX
$EXTERN20EDBIRX
SEXTERN2 GCDBIRX
$EXTERN2 GCSIGREGX
$EXTERN20EDBORX
$EXTERN2 GODBORX
$EXTERN2 GOOD MACHX
SEXTERN2 IDB NI4X
$EXTERN2 IDB NI2X
SEXTERN2 IDB NI0X
SEXTERN2 IDB N8X
SEXTERN2 IDB N6X
$EXTERN2 IDB N4X
SEXTERN2 IDB N2X
$EXTERN2 IDB N0X
SEXTERN2 IB NI4X
SEXTERN2 IB NI2X
SEXTERN2 IB NI0X
SEXTERN2 IB N8X
SEXTERN2 IB N6X
SEXTERN2 IB N4X
SEXTERN2 IB N2X
SEXTERN4 IB N0X
$LOCAL NNN259064 2 1
$LOCAL NNN316064 2 1
$LOCAL NNN373064 2 1
$LOCAL NNN430064 2 1
m
IINJECTIX
ICLRDBIRX
SERIALX
TESTMODEX
ICLRDBORX
CLKIX
IDB NI5X
IDB NI3X
IDB NIIX
IDB N9X
IDB N7X
IDB N5X
IDB N3X
IDB NIX
IB NI5X
IB--NI3X
IB--NIIX
IB--N9X
IB-N7X
IB--N5X
IB N3X
IB NIX
I O REGS
I O REGS
I O REGS
I O REGS
I O REGS
I O REGS
I O REGS
I O REGS
I O REGS
I O REGS
I O REGS
I O REGS
I O REGS
I O REGS
I O REGS
I O REGS
I O REGS
I O REGS
I O REGS
I O REGS
I O REGS
I O REGS
I O REGS
m
Example of GGLOSS Macro Output
Figure 2.6.1
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NOI3
MACRO
DFC %RI,%R2,%II,%I2,%I3,%L
.GNAME%RI
.GNAME%II
.GSAVE %RI
.GNAME%I2
.GSAVE %RI
.GNAME%I3
.GSAVE %RI
.GNAME%R2
.GNAME%RI
C
100%$RETVAL CONTINUE
%RI = (((%RI,.AND.(.NOT.%II,)).OR.(%I2,.AND.%II))
.IF %I3,=XXXX NOI3
1 .AND.%I3
.ANOP
2 )
%R2 = (.NOT.%RI,).OR.(.NOT.%I3,)
$TESTNXT %RI
STESTNXT %R2
GOTO %$DISPAT
C
MEND
Example of GGLOSS Macro Definition
Figure 2.6.2
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2.7 Event Driven Simulation with the GGLOSS Architecture
An event driven simulation is based on the premise that a logic
change at the input to a network propagates forward until it
reaches a gate whose output remains unchanged; at this point, it
doesn't affect other gates in the network. Because of the nature
of Boolean algebra, a large number of gates in a network have
outputs that remain unchanged under changing inputs in normal
operation. Therefore, time would be saved if only those gates
whose inputs changed state were evaluated each clock cycle of the
network.
To determine which gates need to be evaluated, one constructs
an evaluation list within the simulator. At first, network inputs
are examined to see which ones have changed state. Then, gates
that have direct connections to network inputs that have changed
state are placed on the evaluation list. Gates are chosen from the
evaluation list one at a time for computation. As each gate is
evaluated, its output is checked against its previous state. If
the output has changed state, an event has occurred, and all gates
that this gate fans out to are now placed at the end of the
evaluation list. This process continues until there are no more
gates to evaluate on the list, which will occur if the logic is
stable.
In order to implement event driven simulation, GGLOSS requires
- a dispatcher to control computation from the evaluation list,
and
- a fanout table to link the evaluation of one gate to those gates
it fans out to.
The GGLOSS implementation of event driven simulation adds two new
mechanisms to speed up the simulation process:
- The evaluation list is P-ordered. An event driven simulator
need not be P-ordered; the fanout table guarantees that proper
signal propagation is maintained. However, implementing the
evaluation list in P-ordering guarantees the least number of gate
evaluations for a given logic network.
- Event driven simulation is mixed with parallel simulation. This
means that succeeding gates are evaluated if ANY of the 32 parallel
machines have a logic state change, assuming that machine is still
active. While this takes longer than straight event driven
simulation, it produces a larger number of results.
To implement event driven simulation, GGLOSS contains support
in its macro translating stage to build a fanout list from the
logic statement macros themselves. Figure 2.7.1 shows an example
of the FORTRAN code generated to implement an event driven
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simulator.
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20259
C
C
10259 CONTINUE
ST(K+83) = (((ST(K+83).AND.(.NOT.NNN301265_2_I)).OR.(NNN409272_2_I
I.AND.NNN301265_2_I))
2 )
TEMPS = NQ374 85
NQ374_85 = .NOT.ST(K+83)
TESTB = ((NQ374_85.XOR.TEMP$).AND.STOPMASK)
IF(TESTI.NE.0) THEN
DO 20259 J=I,IARRAY(259,2)
DISP(IARRAY(259,J+2) = 1
CONTINUE
ENDIF
DISP(259)=0
GOTO 9999
C
C
10263
20263
CONTINUE
ST(K+84) = (((ST(K+84).AND. (.NOT.NNN301265 2 1)).OR. (NNN449272 2 1
I.AND.NNN301265_2_I))
2 )
TEMPS = NQ374_86
NQ374 86 = .NOT.ST(K+84)
TESTB = ( (NQ374 86.XOR.TEMP$) .AND.STOPMASK)
IF(TESTI.NE.0) tHEN
DO 20263 J=I,IARRAY(263,2)
DISP(IARRAY(263,J+2) = 1
CONTINUE
ENDIF
DISP(263) =0
GOTO 9999
Example of GGLOSS Event Driven Simulator
Figure 2.7.1
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2.8 Deductive Simulation usinq GGLOSS
Deductive simulation is a technique in which all faults can be
checked for detectability with a single execution of the simulator.
In other forms of logic simulation, each fault is translated into
an equivalent logic network, and that logic network is simulated.
The results of simulating the faulted logic network is compared
with a simulation of the good network to determine detectability.
In deductive simulation, only a good logic network is simulated.
However, at the end of each cycle of the master clock, the states
of the good network are checked to see if faults at a each point in
the network could propagate and change the state of the network
output. If so, they are detectable.
This implies that the simulator should perform two operations
each clock cycle of the emulated logic network:
- all gates are evaluated propagating logic values forward from
inputs to output in the normal GGLOSS fashion, and
- Detectability is deduced by examining the network backwards
checking from its output gates toward its inputs.
Each output gate is checked by assuming a fault at each input pin
of that gate. If the fault changes the output state of the gate,
it is detectable. Gates that drive the output gates are checked in
a like manner except only those faults that change the driver gate
outputs to values that are detectable at the output gates are
considered detectable. And so on working through the gates until
the input gates.
GGLOSS performs deductive simulation by assigning variables to
each logic node that indicate both its logic value and its
detectability status. Detectability is determined by gate specific
logic that performs the backward propagation. Figure 2.8.1 shows
an example of the backwards logic for two and gates.
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181
L GZ /---
Detectability Logic for a Two Input AND Gate with an Input
Fault:
IF THE OTHER INPUT IS ONE, FAULT OF THE OPPOSITE LOGIC VALUE ARE
DETECTABLE
In the Above Logic Diagram, Deductive Logic is:
G2 :
GI:
IF (I21 = 1 AND OUTPUT IS DETECTABLE) THEN
I22 = (FAULTS OF OPPOSITE LOGIC VALUE ARE DETECTED)
ENDIF
IF (I22 = 1 AND OUTPUT IS DETECTABLE) THEN
I21 = (FAULTS OF OPPOSITE LOGIC VALUE ARE DETECTED)
DISPATCH G1
ENDIF
IF (Ill m 1 AND I21 IS DETECTABLE) THEN
I12 = (FAULTS OF OPPOSITE LOGIC VALUE ARE DETECTED)
ENDIF
IF (I12 m 1 AND I21 IS DETECTABLE) THEN
Ill = (FAULTS OF OPPOSITE LOGIC VALUE ARE DETECTED)
ENDIF
Example of Deductive Logic Algorithm in GGLOSS
Figure 2.8.1
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2.9 Postprocessor Requirements
In order for GGLOSS to be a useful tool in statistical fault
simulation, a postprocessor must exist to analyze the large amount
of data generated by a GGLOSS simulation and produce useful output.
To perform the computations, it is necessary that the postprocessor
be passed information from the simulator, including:
O the number of frames during which the fault was detected, and
the probability of the inputs simulated during those frames
occurring,
o the output to the comparator(s) that resulted in detection, and
o the time base and fault set size for the simulation.
One of the main uses of GGLOSS is to study the reliability of
computer system architectures; the postprocessor should present to
the reliability engineer various quantities of interest. It would
be impossible to present a list of statistics and graphical data
required for all various studies that GGLOSS can be used to
perform. Such a list requires knowing in advance the exact nature
of these studies, and the general applicability of GGLOSS to a
variety of problems prevents this. It seems more prudent to
include the following capabilities in the postprocessor:
o Present basic information, such as probability of a fault being
detected and a list of all faults not detected.
o Present information of interest to those studying latency, such
as
- average latency time of all faults,
- percentage of faults showing the same error at a comparator,
- histogram of fault latency times,
o Present accuracy and confidence level of the results.
O Compare the results of a GGLOSS run to previous GGLOSS runs
showing the change in the above parameters. This might be done
in histogram form to illustrate changes that occur when a
particular system design parameter is varied.
O Present data on disk that can be used by an external statistical
analysis package to generate other quantities of interest (or
graphical data) without rewriting the postprocessor.
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3. USE OF GGLOSS TO STUDY LATENT FAULTS
3.1 Causes of Failure in Highly Reliable Systems
Before analyzing the reliability of a flight control system
using a simulation methodology, an examination of its architecture
is necessary. Most implementations utilize redundant sensor
modules connected through A/D converters to the control computer
module. The outputs of the processors are connected through D/A
converters to actuator modules and then to the control surfaces
utilizing redundancy where required to maintain reliability.
In some architectures, each sensor/processor/actuator
combination represents a separate and autonomous channel,
communicating with the other two or three channels for failure
management purposes only. Monitoring is done at selected points
within the channel, e.g. at the output of the sensors and the
output of the processors. The number of monitoring points
(sometimes called voting planes) in each channel is a function of
the reliability of each module within that channel and the ability
of the system to reconfigure without that module. The values of
each monitoring point is compared across all the channels. If one
channel disagrees with the other channels at a particular point,
the output feeding that point is disconnected and succeeding
modules receive their input from a functioning neighbor. Additional
hardware modules called comparators perform the comparison and
fault isolation functions, and they must be able to properly handle
their own failures.
In other architectures, each monitor point contains a voter
module connecting it to succeeding module inputs. The voter
receives signals from the same points in all the channels and
transmits a value according to its algorithm (such as mid value)
which is correct even if a single module fails. The result is that
the failure of a single module does not affect the operation of the
system in a manner perceivable to the pilot or passengers. Other
architectures exist in which the comparators and/or voters are
implemented in software, using interprocessor communications
busses.
While monitoring may occur at many points within the channel,
the focus for the studies conducted for this report is monitoring
at the output of processors embedded within the channel. A block
diagram of such a processing system is shown in Figure 3.1.1. To
simplify the studies, the comparator is assumed to be implemented
in hardware, as software comparators require resolving interactive
consistency problems [16].
With this architecture, the factors that may affect system
reliability, in order of decreasing importance, are:
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COMPARATOR COVERAGE
It is apparent that the above architectures are heavily
dependent on the ability of the comparators/voters to handle any
errors that might occur. When errors exist that are not detected
and corrected properly, the failure rate of the system is low, even
if the number of redundant modules is large. The probability that
an error is detected by a comparator is referred to as its
coverage. This problem was explored by Bavuso [4]. As an example,
consider a channel consisting of a processor whose MTBF is i000
hours. Under the assumption of perfect coverage, it is possible to
build a triplex system with a probability of system failure of 10 .9
for a one hour flight. However, if the coverage of the comparator
in this system is only .99, the probability of not handling
properly one faulted processor in the one hour flight is 10 .5. Even
if the comparator coverage is raised by an order of magnitude, the
probability of system failure is still far from acceptable. It is
noted that this is not a problem that can be solved by adding more
channels - in fact, comparator coverage dictates the highest
reliability that can be attained through redundancy.
COVERAGE OF SECONDARY DETECTION MEANS
If the coverage of the comparator can be increased
sufficiently, then other factors become dominant in determining
system reliability. In a triplex system with perfect comparator
coverage, fault isolation may become a significant factor. When
more than two processors are available in the system, the
comparator mechanism will always properly isolate a single fault to
the processor in which it occurs. However, when only two
processors are left operative, a secondary fault isolation means,
such as self-test, must be used to determine which processor is
faulty. The probability of correct fault isolation by this
secondary means is a function of its coverage, and is usually on
the order of .95. The probability of recovery from a second fault
is reduced by this imperfect fault isolation. However, with quad
and quintiplex systems, this is not a significant problem until the
third or fourth failure.
FAULT LATENCY
With perfect coverage of the comparator and secondary
detection means fault latency becomes the dominant factor in
determining system reliability. A highly redundant system has a
greater total hardware component count and therefore a greater
probability of sustaining a fault in one of its components. If the
fault is detected immediately, then reconfiguration occurs,
deleting the faulted processor. However, in a computer based
control system voting only occurs at the end of each control
iteration (frame) and the probability of detecting a random fault
occurring during that iteration is considerably less than one (.5
to .7 as measured by experiments [6]). The fault may be detected
on the next iteration, or on some subsequent iteration; the average
time until detection is different for each fault in the processor
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and is dependent on the software being executed and on the flight
maneuvers.
If the fault remains latent for a significant amount of time,
it is possible for a second latent fault to occur. The two latent
faults may possess different propagation characteristics, and one
may reach the output of a processor before the other one does. In
this case, the system will recover successfully.
It is also possible for both latent faults to have a common
excitation means and reach the comparator at the same iteration.
If this occurs, then two possibilities exist:
- both latent processors present the same output to the
comparator. The comparator is defeated if this is a triplex
system. If this is a quad system, it will see two differing sets
of outputs and it must use a secondary means to decide which
processors are operating correctly. Many quad systems are not
architected with a secondary fault isolation means.
- each latent processor presents a different output to the
comparator. If this is a triplex system, it can recover by
initiating its secondary fault isolation means. Quad systems could
recover directly; however, the reconfiguration algorithm must
remove both faulted processors from the system.
NEAR-COINCIDENT FAULTS
Once the fault is isolated, the system must reconfigure
without the failed processor. The system is likely to fail if
another fault occurs while it is reconfiguring from the first
fault. If reconfiguration time is significant, the probability of
failure during this exposure time can be calculated as was done in
[7]. Note that this definition of near-coincidence is different
that of some authors, who consider latent faults to also be
near-coincident.
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Block Diagram of an N Module Redundant Configuration
Figure 3.1.1
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3.2 Latent Fault Scenario
One important use of GGLOSS is to investigate the probability
of system failure due to latent faults. Latent faults are a
significant factor in ultrahigh reliability configurations. If
some parameters associated with latency can be measured, models
could be constructed to predict the probability of failure of such
a system. While analytic expressions for latent parameters are
extremely complex, measuring their value using GGLOSS provides a
usable technique for reliability estimation.
In order to discuss latent faults, some formal definitions are
required:
Fault Let the processor be represented by a set of components GI,
G 2, ..., G k and an interconnection mapping of the components in G.
Each member in G has a functional model defined in terms of its
inputs and outputs. A fault is defined as a malfunction of one of
the members of G such that its functional model has been altered.
Each member of the set G has an associated set containing all
possible alterations under consideration in a particular
reliability assessment. This set is referred to as the fault
model.
Failure The propagation of a fault so that the output of the
processor is erroneous will be termed a failure of that processor,
a failure of the channel containing that processor, or simply, a
failure.
System failure The propagation of an erroneous value past the
comparator to a surface actuator for at least one iteration of the
control program due to a failure in one or more channels of the
system will be considered a system failure.
Detection The successful detection and isolation of a failure to
its originating channel by a voting comparator or a self-test
program and the subsequent disconnection of that channel will
constitute detection.
Fault Latency The time from the occurrence of a fault, as might be
measured by a suitably placed test probe within the processor (if
placement of such a probe were possible), until its subsequent
appearance at a comparator will be called the fault latency time.
Indistinquishable Faults Those faults whose latency times can be
shown to consistently be infinite will be termed indistinguishable.
All other faults will be termed distinguishable.
Previous work in reliability estimation for flight control
systems has often utilized a worst case approach. It is assumed
that all latent faults result in system failure (sometimes referred
to as malicious excitation). If the overall reliability under this
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assumption is still acceptable, it follows that the actual system
will be more reliable. Bavuso [4] constructed a TMR model based on
this premise. He showed that the overall reliability of a TMR
system is strongly dependent on the coverage of both the comparator
and the secondary detection means. However, as the comparator
deviates slightly from perfect coverage, the reliability of the
system decreases drastically. Nagel [5] and McGough and Swern [6]
showed that the coverage of a comparator in triplex systems is
probably considerably less than perfect.
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3.3 Datency Effects as a Function o_ Architecture
Markov models for the triplex and quad systems were
constructed and are given in Figures 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 respectively.
The probability that two latent faults result in the same bad
output for a given input was measured using GGLOSS and was seen to
be approximately .I. This value was used in the Markov model to
estimate the probability of system failure due to latency for
various average latency times. The results obtained from these
model are shown in Figure 3.3.3. From the table, the following
results were indicated:
- in the triplex system, probability of system failure was not
significantly affected by small latency times until the average
latency time increases to 30 seconds. The worst effects of latency
occurred when the average time was 1 - 2 hours, and reliability
decreased by an order of magnitude.
- in the quad system, if the comparator could not recover from a
tie vote, system reliability is significantly affected for latency
times as low as 1 second. Reliability decreased by an order of
magnitude. When the comparator initiates a secondary fault
isolation upon a tie vote, this situation is significantly improved
(by a factor equivalent to the coverage of the fault isolation
means). The worst effects of latency occurred again when the
comparator could not recover from a tie vote and the average
latency time was 1-2 hours; the reliability of the quad system was
decreased below that of the triplex system!!!
Latent faults can have a significant effect on the reliability
of a redundant processing system. The extent of this effect must
be carefully measured to insure that it is not dominant cause of
system failure. From the Markov models it was concluded that:
- Fault latency can become the limiting factor in the construction
of ultra-reliable computing system when the desired probability of
system failure is less than 10 .9.
- When latency effects are significant, even the benefits of a
fourth processor in improving system reliability may be lost.
Extremely long latency times cause the quad system to become less
reliable than the triplex.
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G = GOOD PROCESSOR
L = PROCESSOR WITH LATENT FAULT
B = BAD PROCESSOR
X = FAULT RATE OF A SINGLE PROCESSOR
C = PROBATIL[TT THAT A FAULT IS
DETECTED IMMEDIATELY
F = RATE OF PROPAGATION OF LATENT
FAULTS TO A COMPARATOR
6 = PROBABILITY TWO LATENT FAULTS RESUL
RESULT IN THE SAME ERRONEOUS
OUTPUT
FAIL
Markov Model of a Triplex System Including Latency But Without
Repair
Figure 3.3.1
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er6 FAIL
G = GOOD PROCESSOR
L = PROCESSOR WITH LATENT FAULT
B = BAD PROCESSOR
X = FAULT RATE OF A SINGLE PROCESSOR
C = PROBATILITY THAT A FAULT IS
DETECTED IMMEDIATELY
F = RATE OF PROPAGATION OF LATENT
FAULTS TO A COMPARATOR
6 = PROBABILITY TWO LATENT FAULTS RESUL
RESULT [N THE SAME ERRONEOUS
OUTPUT
XC
Markov Model of a Quad System Including Latency But Without
Repair
Figure 3.3.2
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PROBABILITY OF FAILURE AS A FUNCTION OF LATENCY
FOR 6 - . 1
TRIPLEX
r - 21HR
F - IIMIN
r - IlSEC
QUAO
F - 21HR
F - I/MIN
F - I/SEC
C = .5 C = .7 C = .85
2.9 E -8
3.4 E -9
1.0 E -9
5.7 E -8
4.8 E -9
8.7 E -11
1.1 E -8
1.8 E -9
1.0 E -9
2.0 E -8
1.7 E -9
3.1 E -11
FOR 5 - . 2
3.3 E -9
1.2 E -9
1.0 E -9
5.0 E -9
4.4 E -10
8.6 E -12
TRIPLEX
F - 21HR
F - IlHIN
r , IlSEC
QUAD
F - 21HR
F - llNIN
F - IISEC
C m .5
5.7 E -8
5.8 E -9
1.0 E -9
1.1 E -7
9.0 E -9
1.6 E -10
C m .7
2.1 E -8
2.7 E -9
1.0 E -9
4.1 E -8
3.5 E -9
6. I E -11
C - .85
5.9 E -9
1.4 E -9
1.0 E -9
1.0 E -8
8.7 E -10
1.6 E -11
C - PROBABILITY THAT A FAULT IS DETECTED IMMEDIATELY
F - RATE OF PROPAGATION OF LATENT FAULTS TO THE COHPARATOR
6 - PROBABILITY THAT TWO LATENT FAULTS RESULT IN THE SAME BAD
OUTPUT Figure 3.3.3
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3.4 Description of Latent Fault Studies
Experiments on a sophisticated processing system running a
complete flight program are impractical at the present time because
of system complexity and the large number of factors that affect
the interpretation of the results. However, a simplified processor
(herein referred to as the "toy processor") is available that is
used for these studies while it runs an extremely simple program
representing the flight controller. It is hoped that the results
of these studies will furnish data that may be used to construct
better model of reliability for a more complex system.
The current set of experiments were performed independent of
dynamic flight maneuvers, i.e. inputs are assumed to be
uncorrelated. All variations in flight path are due to a noise
input such as mild turbulence, etc. While a particular flight
maneuver might imply a change in control law to another mode of
operation, this is not being modeled at this time.
The toy processor contains approximately 1600 possible faults
comprising its fault set. The control program to be run is given
in Figure 3.5.1. This program contains a single input and a single
output. The output will be considered to drive a comparator while
the input will take on random values. The methodology for the
experiments was to run each of the 1600 faults with as many
different input variable sequences as possible. The program will
be run for a small number of control algorithm iterations and the
time (in iterations ) that the faulted system output disagrees with
the output from a nonfaulted machine will be recorded (detection
time) if the fault is detected. The data will then be used to
calculate the quantities of interest.
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3.5 Probabilit7 of STstem Failure Due to Latent Faults
Definition of Parameters Associated with Latency
Consider the aircraft in automatic control terminology, with
the processor and its software together forming the controller and
the aircraft and its environment represent the controlled vehicle
or, in modern control parlance, the plant. Together, the plant and
controller form an autonomous, stochastic and discrete system. If
the environment could be frozen and repeated for every flight, then
the aircraft path from take-off to landing would be deterministic.
Random variations in the path that are observed from flight to
flight come from turbulence, electrical noise and other phenomena
the aircraft might experience in normal operation.
Such a system can be represented on a suitable discrete state
space with the dynamics of the system represented by a suitable
transformation function. This function maps the state space onto
itself for each iteration of the control program. Let
J= (1, 2, ... , M ) (3.5.1)
represent the set of numbers that can be stored in a register or
memory location, where M is the largest such unsigned integer. The
control equations operate on a state vector X of dimension n, where
X E jn (3.5.2)
A system defined on X without any input would be a purely
deterministic system. In order to introduce the normal variations
that occur during a flight, let W represent a random input to the
state equations. Let it be further assumed that the system is time
invariant. This is not a strict requirement in the work that is to
follow; however, it simplifies the resulting expressions and
obviates the need for an absolute time base. The system equations
are
X(k+l) = g(_X(k) ,W(k))
Y(k) = h(X(k)) (3.5.3)
where
W _ J is a random variable representing noise,
Y _ J is the comparator input,
g: j,+1 _ jn is a mapping that takes the processor from its
present state into the next state, and
h: jn . j is a mapping that relates the comparator input
to the state variables.
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It can be seen that g is a nonlinear function dependent upon the
processor architecture, the software, the control algorithm, and
the response of the aircraft.
There exists no general form for solutions to (3.5.3).
However, the systems under consideration are realizable which
implies the existence of a transition function _ which takes X from
a particular set of initial conditions at a particular instant to
some future point on the flight path. Let W represent a particular
noise history, and let j represent a particular iteration of the
control program with associated state vector X(j). Then the output
at the comparator after m iterations from j can be obtained from
the relation
Y(j+m) = h(_(X(j),W,m)). (3.5.4)
Let us assume that a fault occurs at iteration j. This causes an
alteration of the system into a new system, although the new system
is still defined on the same state space (some states in the
original space may be unreachable by the new system due to the
fault). The mappings g, h, and _, are changed by the fault so that
X(k+l) = gn(X(k),W(k))
Y(k) = hn(X(k)) (3.5.5)
where gn and h. are the mappings for a particular fault n chosen
from the space of all possible faults of the processor, _. For
completeness, let n=0 E _ be the unfaulted state.
Let nl and n2 be processor faults, nl,n2 E _. Let a
comparator be connected between two like processors at Y, one
processor containing fault nl, and one processor containing fault
n2. Then the Detection Function is given by
= 0 if hn,(#,1(X(j),W,m)) = h_(#_(X(j),W,m))
Dnl (X,W, n2,m) (3.5.6)
= 1 if hn1(_n1(X(j),W,m)) = hn2(_(X(j),W,m)) "
If nl = 0, then D0(X,W,n,m ) is the Detection Function for comparing
the output of a good processor to the output of a processor with
fault n. Further, the Latency Time of a Fault is defined by
T(X,W,n) = min { m I D0(X,W,m,n) = 1 ). (3.5.7)
Let X represent the upper bound of the space of all possible states
of the system in a normal flight, and _ represent the upper bound
of the space of variations of the noise W. A latent fault is one
whose latency function L(n) is one, where L(n) = 0 if D0(Xk,Wt,n,l )
= 1 for all k_x, IEN and L(n) = 1 otherwise. If
P(fn) = failure rate of each component
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= failure rate of the processor
then the rate of occurrence of latent faults is
IFL = 7. p(fn) L(n).
nEn
Then the expected value of T can be computed for each fault n as
X n
_(n) = 7. 7. p(X ) p(W ) T(X ,W ,n) L(n) (3.5.8)
k=l i=i k 1 k 1
and the overall expected value of latency for the system is just
the weighted sum of the latency times for each fault
T
= (I / IFL ) 7. P(fn) t (n) (3.5.9)
n=l
where
= probability of a fault occurring in a processor.
Consider the effect of a latent fault on the probability of
failure of a redundant system. McGough [7] discusses the
probability of a second fault occurring before recovery from the
first fault is complete. Because the recovery time is small, he
considers the faults to be concurrent. With latent faults the
computations are similar except that latency time can be much
longer than recovery time.
Two faults will be considered similar when the first erroneous
value that reaches the comparator after the fault occurs is the
same for both. By previous definition, the existence of two
failures giving similar signals to the comparator for at least one
iteration leads to a failure of the system. This is somewhat
conservative because, unless the inputs to the comparator are
equivalent for a large number of iterations, it is possible for the
dual faults to be detected before a harmful output arrives at the
aircraft surface. When the latency time of the first fault is
nonzero, the probability of failure can be approximated by the
product of two terms
P( failure ) = P( ist ) P( 2nd Iist ) (3.5.zo)
where
P( ist ) = probability that a fault occurs and is not
detected, and
P( 2nd Iist ) = probability that a second similar fault
occurs given that the first fault occurred
and was not detected.
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The probability that the first fault occurs and is not
detected in a NMR system is simply
P( ist ) = N I ( 1 - Cl) AT (3.5.11)
where
AT = time from the beginning of the flight
Cl = percentage of faults detected by the comparator
immediately after they occur
N = number pf redundant modules in the system.
A more formal definition of Cl appears later in conjunction with
triplex systems. In (3.5.11) it is assumed that a constant value
for C1 can be fount that characterizes the system under
consideration. The average time it takes to detect a fault can be
computed from (8). Then the conditional probability required for
(3.5.10) is
P(2nd Iist) = (N-l) (I-C1) Z P(fn) 7(n) 6(n) (3.5.12)
n=l
where 6(n) is a function that denotes the probability of a new
fault giving the same output at the comparator as the old fault.
More formally,
Z
i=l
i_n
P(fi) (l-Dn(Xk,Wt,i,l))
6(n) = T p(xk) T. p(W[) (3.5.13)
k=l i=i
T. P(fn) D0(Xk,Wt, i, i)
i=l
A more useful quantity may be defined in terms of the overall
probability of a second fault giving the same output as the first.
Let
_" P(fn) _(n) 6(n) = I 7 6
n=l
(3.5.14)
m
where 7 is as defined in (9), and 6-is a new quantity measuring the
expected value of 6(n). 6-is considered defined by (3.5.14). Then
the overall probability of failure due to a latent fault is
P( failure ) = N (N-l) 12 (I-C1) 2 AT _ 6. (3.5.15)
Experiments Measurinq Parameter Values
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Using the processor and software enumerated in section 3.4, a
study was performed to obtain some values for the parameters
enumerated above. The toy processor was simulated using GGLOSS
while it executed a simple flight control program. The program is
given in Figure 3.5.1. The system architecture in which the
processors operate is shown in Figure 3.5.2. The characteristics
of this architecture are used to compute system reliability.
In this architecture, each processor operates autonomously and
outputs to a hardware monitor which consolidates its inputs to a
single value which in turn drives the control surface. The
comparator contains a majority voter that prevents a failed channel
from driving the control surface, and a comparator which disengages
the failed channel from the system. It is assumed that the monitor
is capable of detecting and isolating all failed channels that
present an output to the monitor that is different from the output
of a good channel. That is, the hardware coverage of this
comparator is one hundred percent.
Because of the autonomy of each processor and the symmetry of
the architecture, it is unnecessary to simulate more than one
processor of the n-plex to determine its failure characteristics.
The output of this faulted processor is compared with the output of
a good processor at the end of each control program iteration. If
the outputs are the same, the fault has not been detected. If the
outputs differ, detection has occurred. Once detection occurs, the
experiment ends.
The methodology used in the experiments was to inject a fault
into the processor, and iterate the flight control program with a
random number as an input. The output is then compared with the
output of a good processor running the same problem. The results
are recorded. The processor is then reinitialized and the process
is repeated with another random number.
This process was repeated for 128 unique random inputs. The
flight control program was written to have no "memory", i.e. each
computation is independent of the results of the previous
computation. The program has two inputs of eight bits; hence the
study represents only a small portion of the 65,536 possible input
combinations that could be presented to the program. However, the
128 inputs exercised half of the possible values that could be
presented to the eight bit bus structure of the processor which
made this a significant exercise of its hardware.
All gate faults were considered equally probable for this
study. While GGLOSS is capable of accepting different failure
rates for each gate type, the values were all set the same.
The output of the simulation is summarized in Table 3.5.1,
which contains:
- the number of iterations for which the fault was detected from
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a total of 128 iterations with different inputs,
- the average number of iterations it took to detect this fault,
which is just the previous number divided by 128. This number is
an estimator for T(n) as given by (8),
- when the fault output an erroneous value to the comparator, the
average number of faults that output the same value to the
comparator for the same input. This number is an estimator for
6(n) as defined by (3.5.13).
The value of 6(n) is obtained by first computing 6(W,n) for each
successful detection. GGLOSS records the erroneous outputs of each
channel for each input. 6(W,n) is computed by counting the number
channel outputs that are the same for a particular input and
dividing that by the total number of erroneous outputs for that
input. It is assumed that all inputs are equiprobable. Then 6(n)
is just the average value of all the 6(W,n) computed for this
fault.
The faults can be grouped by iteration time to obtain a
latency table. This was done, and is shown in Table 3.5.2. Using
the data in the table and (3.5.9), one obtains
m
7 = 4.18 iterations,
and, from (3.5.14)
= .0706.
From the table, it is noted that the probability of detecting a
fault on the first iteration after it occurs is .489. This is the
quantity Cl referred to in (3.5.11). Let it be further assumed
that the iteration rate of the processor is ten times per second
and the duration of the flight is one hour. Then from (3.5.15) the
probability of system failure due to latency for a triplex system
with a failure rate of .001 is
P (Failure Due to Fault Latency) = 1.16 x i0-ii.
Now this is not a significant factor in system reliability, even
for a commercial flight. However, if for the same system the
average detection time were to increase to two minutes due to
environmental conditions, then
P (Failure Due to Fault Latency) = 1.55 x 10-9.
Table 3.5.2 also shows that the percentage of faults that are
never detected is 20.7. It was desired to analyze why these faults
were not detected. This was done, and is given in Table 3.5.3. In
general, these faults can be grouped into four categories:
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- faults that would be detected if more inputs were considered,
- faults that will never be detected by this program, but could
be detected by some other program,
- faults that represent overdesign, etc. and will never be
detected, and
- faults that are anomalies of the simulation and don't really
exist.
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00:
01:
02:
03:
04:
O5:
06:
07:
O8:
09:
20:
21:
60 START:
A0
F0
B0
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A0
E1
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00
VARIABLES
00 TEMP:
00 OUT:
PORTS
30 IPORT
31 OPORT
STA TEMP
SUB TEMP
ADD IPORT
SUB IPORT
STA OUT
STA TEMP
SUB TEMP
ADD OUT
STA OPORT
BNO START
DC 0
DC 0
EQU 48
EQU 49
; CLEAR ACCUMULATOR
; GET SENSOR INPUT
; NEW - OLD
; NEW OUTPUT VALUE
; CLEAR ACCUMULATOR
; CAN BE NO OVERFLOW
; OUTPUT VALUE
Simple Flight Control Program
Figure 3.5.1
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SURFACE5
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NMR Architecture
Figure 3.5.2
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FAULT NO. DETECTS AVG TIME FAULTS WITH SAME OUTPUT
(ITER.) (PERCENTAGE)
(n) 6 (n)
D3U38: A* 0 128 1.00
D3U38: A* 1 128 1.00
D3U38: B* 0 128 1.00
D3U38: B* 1 0 0.00
D3U38: Y* 0 128 1.00
D3U38: Y* 1 128 1.00
D4U38: A* 0 128 1.00
D4U38: A* 1 0 0.00
D4U38: B* 0 128 1.00
D4U38: B* 1 0 0.00
D4U38: Y* 0 0 0.00
D4U38: Y* 1 128 1.00
DIU27: A* 0 86 1.49
DIU27: A* 1 53 2.42
DIU27: Y* 0 53 2.42
DIU27: Y* 1 86 1.49
DIU28: A* 0 128 1.00
DIU28: A* 1 76 1.68
DIU28: Y* 0 76 1.68
DIU28: Y* 1 128 1.00
DIU29: A* 0 44 2.91
DIU29: A* 1 26 4.92
DIU29: Y* 0 26 4.92
DIU29: Y* 1 44 2.91
DIU30: A* 0 128 1.00
DIU30: A* 1 93 1.38
DIU30: Y* 0 93 1.38
DIU30: Y* 1 128 1.00
D2U27: A* 0 128 1.00
D2U27: A* 1 20 6.40
D2U27: Y* 0 0 0.00
D2U27: Y, 1 20 6.40
0.03
0.04
0.04
0.03
0.06
0.06
0.i0
0.08
0.08
0.10
0.09
0.09
0.04
0.04
Tabular Postprocessor Output for Flight Control Program
Table 3.5.1
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TIME (ITERATIONS)
UNDETECTED
ALWAYS DETECTED
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
i0
Ii
12
FAULTS
351
829
220
49
28
6
55
15
29
26
13
9
ii
PERCENT OF TOTAL
20.7
48.9
13.0
2.9
1.7
.4
3.2
.9
1.7
1.5
.8
.5
.6
Latency Distribution of the Faults
Table 3.5.2
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NUMBER OF UNDETECTED FAULTS
- NOT UTILIZING ALL OF RAM/ROM
- NO INPUT VALUE STIMULATED FAULT
- BRANCH INSTRUCTION NOT USED
- SIMULATION ANOMALIES
- MEMORY SHUT OFF DURING UNUSED CYCLES
- OVERDESIGN OF PROCESSOR
TOTAL NUMBER OF FAULTS INJECTED
351
140
73
70
44
12
12
1692
20.17%
Resolution of Undetected Faults
Table 3.5.3
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3.6 Latenc 7 Characteristics of a Processor/Proqram Combination
Development of a Markov Model
A large portion of the flight regime consists of the cruise
mode, which is a holding or tracking mode. The deterministic
component of the system response is invariant; the perturbations
occur due to noise and turbulence. The system will operate in a
fixed region of the trajectory X with variations due to W; for the
work that is to follow, these variations will be considered
gaussian. The remaining equations in this section will be derived
independent of X. The probability of the program detecting a
failure in the first iteration of the control algorithm after the
fault occurs is
n
P(D) = (i/l) Z Z P(f.) P(W t) D0(WL,n,I). (3.6.1)
n=l i=I
Let a new measure of fault detection detectability be defined as
n
I, if max I Z D0(Wt,n,k ) I > 0
k>0 i=I
D*(n) = (3.6.2)
n
i = o.o, if max I z D0(Wt,n,k ) ,
k>0 i=i
Then the probability that a fault will be detected at all is
P = Z P(f,) D*(n) (3.6.3)
n=l
where (l-P) is the probability that a fault is indistinguishable.
As a basis for modeling system behavior, consider that a large
number of faults are sensitive to only one bit in a particular
component of X. If this bit varies randomly, then the probability
of detecting a fault with this sensitivity is .5 for each
iteration. Other faults are sensitive to a combination of two
bits. Their probability of detection is .25 for each iteration.
The concept may be extended so that a class of faults @+ is defined
as
n
f, E @i if z P(W t) D0(Wt,n,l ) = I/i
i=I
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fn e 80 if
n
T P(W[) D0(Wl,n,l ) = 1
i=i
(3.6.4)
where i E @.
The probability that a fault belongs to class i is
Pi = (l/k) T p(fn)
n(0 i
(3.6.5)
so that (3.6.1) may be rewritten as
P(D) = P0 + _' Pi/i-
i_@
i>0
(3.6.6)
From (3.6.4) - (3.6.6) one may construct a four state Markov
model of this process that is identical to the urn model
constructed by Nagel [5]. The model is shown diagrammatically in
Figure 3.6.1. Define
P' = P(D)/P ; o = (P(D) - P0)/(P - P0) (3.6.7)
Let F represent the cumulative probability of detection in any
iteration up to k
FI(D ) = p p,
F2(D) = P P' + P (I-P') a
F3(D) = P P' + P (I-P') 0 + P (I-P') (l-a) o
Fk(D) = P P' + P (I-P') o + P
k-2
T (I-P') (l-o) n o
n=l
(3.6.8)
A more interesting model can be constructed with five states
where the fault class 82 represents a state, and the remainder of
fault classes are combined to form the remaining state. Now define
the auxiliary parameters
P' = P(D)/P ; P'' = (P(D) - P0 - P2/2)/(P - P0 - P2)
Then
FI(D ) = p P'
F2(D ) = P P" + P (I-P') (P2/2 + (I-P 2) P'')
k-2
Fk(D ) = P P' + P (I-P') P2 [1/2 + _ (i/2) n 1/2] +
n=l
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k-2
P (l-P') (l-P2) [P'' + Z (l-P'') n P'']
n=l
(3.6.9)
A Markov model representing the above equations is shown in
Figure 3.6.2.
The Markov diagram can be extended to more states. Define the
auxiliary function
k-2
@(k,_) = o + T. (l-U)n
n=l
(3.6.10)
Now let e3, 84, 85, etc. represent states in the Markov diagram.
Let #* represent the subset of _ that are states in the diagram,
noting that e0 is not a member of _*. Now form equations for this
model corresponding to (3.6.9):
P' = P(D)/P ; P* = Z Pi
P'' = (P(D) - P0- Z Pi/i)/(l - P0 - P*)
FI(D ) = p P'
F2(D) = P P' + P (I-P') [ (l-P*) P'' + Z Pi /i ]
Fk(D) = P P' + P (I-P') Z Pi _(k,i/i)
i_*
+
P (I-P') (l-P*) _(k,P'') (3.6.11)
A general Markov model is illustrated in Figure 3.6.3.
Evaluation of Transition Probabilities
It would be constructive to compare the results of a more
complex model with the results obtained for the urn model described
in Nagel's original study [5]. The urn model is given by (3.6.8).
The transition probabilities for the simple flight control program
used in the last section were calculated based on the data in Table
3.5.3. From that table is seen that
P
= .793 = probability that the fault is detected
eventually
pl = .735 = (P0+ P2/2 + P3/3 + P4/4 + ...)/P = probability
that the fault is detected on the first
iteration, given that it will eventually be
detected
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a
= .388 = probability that the fault is detected during
each subsequent iteration, obtained from
(3.6.v)
An earlier work of McGough and Swern [6] quotes the following
numbers for these parameters:
P P" s
SERCOM .55 .84 .49
LINCON .55 .97 .24
QUAD .58 .86 .66
FCS .66 .94 .87
A complete description of these programs is given in [5], and is
omitted here.
A comparison of results is extremely hard at this point
because the above programs are of different sizes and run on
different computers. The simplicity of the "toy" processor may
account for the larger value of P because even a simple program
exercises all of its hardware. Simple programs generally have
lower values of a, a trend which is also true here. First
iteration detection P' may be a function of the hardware
architecture of the processor. However, the above is merely
conjecture and more studies would have to be done to confirm them.
Using (3.6.9) a more sophisticate model of the
processor/program combination can be obtained. The relevant
transition probabilities are summarized in Table 3.6.1; however, it
seems preferable to present the data in graphical form as in Figure
3.6.4. It was expected that a large number of faults would be
detected after two iterations. However, it was conjectured that
the number of faults detected would decrease as a function of the
number of iterations thereafter. Such is not the case; the figure
shows distinct peaks at 6 and 8 iterations. While the peaks could
represent experimental anomalies, this effect warrants further
studies.
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Urn Model Markov Diagram
Figure 3.6.1
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Figure 3.6.2
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Generalized Program Markov Diagram
Figure 3.6.3
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Figure 3.6.4
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FAULT CLASS
P
P0
P2
P3
P4
P6
P8
P12
P18
PROBABILITY
.79
.489
.130
.029
.021
.032
.041
.028
.023
Model Parameters for Processor/Program Results
Table 3.6.1
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3.7 Measurements of a TMR System
TMR System Architecture
The Triple Module Redundant system under consideration is
shown in Figure 3.7.1. It contains three similar computational
channels replicated from the analog sensors to the actuators that
command the aircraft surfaces. Each channel is a complete flight
controller which operates independently of the other two. For
fault detection, a voting monitor is implemented in hardware at the
output to the actuators. This type of monitor is reminiscent of
earlier analog systems, and analog comparators, already proven in
field service, are used. The voter is a mid value select device
which masks the fault from reaching the surface and causing
erroneous control of the aircraft (which would constitute a system
failure). Logic exists in either hardware or software so that,
when one channel fails, it is disengaged. The remaining two
channels continue controlling the aircraft, comparing their outputs
one against the other. When a discrepancy occurs, both processors
will execute a self-test program to determine which channel has
failed. If one channel passes self-test and one channel fails, then
the good channel will continue controlling the aircraft and the bad
channel will be disengaged. If both channels pass (or fail) the
self-test, then one channel will arbitrarily be chosen to control
the aircraft and the other disengaged.
Modelinq the TMR System
It would be useful to study a Markov model of this system with
latent faults included. To construct this model, some new
parameters must be defined to form the transition rates. Let
_t (Xk'Wk) = ( n I n E 7, T(_k,Wk,n) = t ) (3.7.1)
represent the set of faults that are detected at iteration t. The
probability of detection of a fault at t is given by
yt(Xk,Wk) = (i/_) _ P(fn)" (3.7.2)
n_ t
The probability that the fault is detected within a certain number
of iterations, a, given that a fault occurred, is
CI(Xk,Wk,_ ) = _ Yt
t<_
(3.7.3)
This is a general form of the same Cl that was defined earlier as
the percentage of faults detected by the comparator. However, in
(3.7.3), C1 is seen to be a function of the initial conditions on
the aircraft and the random noise.
8O
The rate of fault detection per iteration is also required.
Denoting this function by F, it may be estimated by
i
F(Xk,Wk) < max it Yt I (3.7.4)
t>_
Both (3.7.3) and (3.7.4) are functions of t and a. One object of
the experiments in the next section is to test the conjecture that,
for a given X and W, the variation in C1 and F over a relatively
short time (with respect to the duration of the flight) is small.
Then Cl and F are chiefly functions of the flight conditions X and
the noise W. If the noise W is expected to be random, then it too
will cause relatively small variations in Cl and F.
The remaining factor that might adversely effect the
probability of system failure is the change in flight conditions X.
The implication here is that failures that are not detected during
the cruise portion of the flight regime might accumulate, although
the probability of their effecting the control surface during this
mode is low. However, when switching to landing modes, the values
of Cl and F might change in such a manner that the overall
probability of failure of the system is adversely effected.
To complete construction of a Markov model for the studies to
follow, let a=l in (3.7.3) and (3.7.4) above. For each value of
and W, there are values associated with Cl and F. These
parameters, along with other parameters defined in previous
sections, are used to form the transition probabilities. Since
and W are functions of time with respect to the beginning of the
flight, the model is still Markov; however, it is non-homogeneous.
Figure 3.7.2 shows the model used for analysis in the studies to
follow.
TMR System Experiments
Two groups of experiments were done on the TMR architecture.
In the first experiment, the sensitivity of the TMR Markov model
with latent faults was determined as a function of the latent fault
detection rate. The Markov model given in Figure 3.7.2 is a
function of five parameters:
l single channel failure rate,
Cl comparator primary software coverage as defined in (3.7.3),
C2 secondary detection means coverage,
F propagation rate of latent failures, and
6 the probability that two latent failures are excited and
produce the same erroneous output at the comparator.
A value of _ of .001 failures per hour was used in all computer
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studies for this experiment. From the previous studies, a value
for Cl of .5 was considered reasonable. C2 and d were allowed to
take on three discrete values:
C2: .95, .99, 1.0
6: .3, .i, .01
The parameter F was allowed to vary over its full range. The
resulting probability of system failure was plotted as a function
of F in Figure 3.7.3.
The results can be interpreted from architectural
considerations. A propagation rate of latent faults of zero
implies that (l.0-Cl) of the possible hardware faults never affect
the operation of the processor. Then the processor operates uses
less hardware, and the resultant probability of failure is smaller.
on the other hand, if the propagation rate of latent faults is very
high it is as if no fault ever becomes latent and Cl = 1.0. Thus
the two endpoints of the curves are easily predictable neglecting
the dynamics of the latency itself.
In the middle region of F, its effect depends on whether or
not two latent faults are likely to have the same erroneous output.
When this is not the case, latency actually improves the
survivability of the system as a certain percentage of the faults
may remain latent until the end of the flight. When the
probability of two latent faults giving the same erroneous output
is high, then system performance suffers dramatically. However,
there is a latent failure propagation rate which is most disastrous
for the system, and this rate can be calculated based on the other
parameters.
A second flight control program was constructed that contained
both a flight control algorithm and a software comparator and
voter. A block diagram of this architecture is shown in Figure
3.7.4, and the flight control program is given in Figure 3.7.5.
The computed output of each processor was passed to the other
processor using shared memory. Each processor compared its output
with both its neighbors output, and only transmitted that output to
the control surface if there was agreement with at least one
neighbor. If there was no agreement, then the processor went into
a loop.
In this situation, a failure of the processor can also mean a
failure of the comparator/monitor. While this particular algorithm
might not be a realistic way to monitor a flight control system, it
was deemed an good test of the GGLOSS simulator because GGLOSS
simulated all three processors at the same time running slightly
different control programs.
The study showed that the software monitor was capable of
detecting 85 percent of hardware faults that were detectable during
the iterations that the simulator ran. That is, if the software
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comparator were compared to a perfect hardware comparator, it would
detect failures 85 percent of the time. With respect to latency,
the results were similar to what was reported in the previous
sections.
The results are summarized in Table 3.7.1.
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PROCESSO;
PROCESSOR
PROCESSOR
TMR Architecture
Figure 3.7.1
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3 GOOD 2 GOOD
I BAD
] GOOD
2 BAD
2 GOOD
1 LATENT
l GOOD
1 BAD
I LATENT
x(l-cl) '
| LATENT
2 8AD
1 GOOD
2 LATENT
2 LATENT
] BAD
0
x(l-c l)
3 LATENT
FAIL
TMR Markov Diagram
Figure 3.7.2
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87
00:
01:
O2:
03:
04:
O5:
06:
07:
O8:
09:
0A:
0B:
OC:
0D:
0E:
OF:
i0:
ii:
12:
13:
14:
15:
16:
17:
18:
19:
60
A0
F0
B0
61
64
START:
FAILURE LOGIC
60
A0
E2
A1
DE
DF
10
F1
71
00
6O
A0
E3
TRY2:
A1
DE
DF
IA
FI
71
00
STA TEMP
SUB TEMP
ADD IPORT
SUB IPORT
STA OUT
STA OUT3
STA TEMP
SUB TEMP
ADD OUT1
SUB OUT
ADD M127
ADD M1
BNO TRY2
ADD OUT
STA OPORT
BNO START
STA TEMP
SUB TEMP
ADD OUT2
SUB OUT
ADD M127
ADD M1
BNO BAD
ADD OUT
STA OPORT
BNO START
; CLEAR ACCUMULATOR
; GET SENSOR INPUT
; NEW - OLD
; NEW OUTPUT VALUE
; PUT IT IN COMMON
MEMORY
; CLEAR ACCUMULATOR
; GET FIRST PROC.
OUTPUT
; SUBTRACT THIS OUTPUT
; INDUCE OVERFLOW
; OVERFLOW ONLY IF ALL
OK
; NOT GOOD, TRY AGAIN
; PUT OUTPUT IN REG
; OUTPUT THIS VALUE
; DO ANOTHER ITERATION
; CLEAR ACCUMULATOR
; GET SECOND PROC.
OUTPUT
; SUBTRACT THIS OUTPUT
; INDUCE OVERFLOW
; OVERFLOW ONLY IF ALL
OK
; FAILS ON TWO TRIES
; PUT OUTPUT IN REG
; OUTPUT THIS VALUE
; DO ANOTHER ITERATION
Flight Control Program for Triplex Study
Figure 3.7.5
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IA:
IB:
iC:
ID:
IE:
IF:
20:
21:
22:
23:
24:
WHEN A FAILURE IS DETECTED, LOOP HERE FOREVER
60 BAD: STA TEMP
A0 SUB TEMP
E0 ADD TEMP
IA BNO BAD
; CLEAR ACCUMULATOR
; SHOULD BE NO
OVERFLOW
; LOOP FOREVER
DATA CONSTANTS
7F M127: DC 127
01 MI: DC 1
LOCAL VARIABLES
00 TEMP: DC 0
O0 OUT: DC 0
SHARED MEMORY VARIABLES
00 OUT1: DC 0
00 OUT2: DC 0
00 OUT3: DC 0
MEMORY MAPPED I/O
30 IPORT EQU 48
31 OPORT EQU 49
Flight Control Program for Triplex Study
(continued)
Figure 3.7.5
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SYSTEM AVERAGE DETECTION TIME:
ACTIVE FAULT COMPARATOR COVERAGE:
4.853175
0.8514851
DET. TIME NO. FAULTS
0.00
1.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
5.00
6.00
7.00
8.00
9.00
10.00
i0
53
3
2
1
5
1
1
1
1
1
PERCENT OF TOTAL
12.7
67.1
3.8
2.5
1.3
6.3
1.3
1.3
1.3
1.3
1.3
Results of Triplex Study
Table 3.7.1
90
3.8 Latency Characteristics as a function of System Mode
Earlier sections developed both a Markov model representing the
latency characteristics of a processor/program combination and a
Markov model representing the effects of latent faults on the
reliability of a triplex system. It was shown that the latency
time associated with a fault varies significantly across the fault
set of a particular processor. Further, latency time can be a key
factor in determining the probability of system failure in a
triplex system. The present work continues this investigation by
considering how the execution of different portions of the control
program during a flight mission affects system reliability.
The parameters that characterize fault latency are strongly
dependent on the actual hardware and software in operation during
a given mission. In order to obtain a feel for these parameters,
a simple processor was modeled (the "toy" microprocessor") running
a simple flight control program. Stuck-at-one and stuck-at-zero
faults were injected into the processor using GGLOSS and the number
of iterations until detection was recorded. To examine the effects
of modal change, a longitudinal pitch control system was
implemented possessing both a vertical speed mode and a flare mode
(to simulate landing). Modal change occurred at 40 feet as a
function of programmed logic. A block diagram of the control
system is given in Figure 3.8.1, and the actual programs are listed
in Figure 3.8.2.
It is desirable to define a parameter set that characterizes
latency for a given processor/program combination. Let each
processor in a redundant system have an associated fault set n so
that n E _ represents a fault on a processor. The system guides
the aircraft through a trajectory represented by the vector X and
experiences a noise history W. Recall from section 3.6 that a
detection function D0(X,W_n,m ) was defined such that D O = 0 if the
output of the processor is the same as that of a good processor
after m iterations and D O = 1 if the output differs from a good
processor after m iterations. Then the latency time of the fault
is defined by
T(X,W,n) = min ( m I D0(X,W,m,n) = 1 ). (3.8.1)
Let l(fn) represent the rate of occurrence of fault n, calculated
according to the rules discussed in section 2.1, and It represent
the failure rate of the processor as a whole. Then, glven that the
processor has a fault, the probability that fault n occurs is
P(fn) =l(fn)/l t. (3.8.2)
Consider flying a mission represented by a certain time history of
X. When the average latency time of a fault occurring during this
mission is i iterations, that fault belongs to fault class 8i.
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Define
P(i,n) =
0 if Z P(Wk) T(X,Wk,n ) _ i
ken
1 if Z P(Wk) T(X,Wk,n ) = i
k_n
so that, if a fault occurs in a processor, the probability that it
belongs to fault class i is
P(Si) = Z P(i,n) P(fn). (3.8.3)
n_
For a given processor/program combination and a given mission, the
latency behavior of the system can be characterized by the set
P(@i.) where @i represents the latency class of the fault and i
varles from 2 to _. In practice, there are only a finite number of
@_ with nonzero probability. A simple way to present latency
c_aracteristics is to plot P(Si) versus @i"
The latency distributions for each of the three software
modules (vertical speed, flare, and modal logic) appears in Figures
3.8.3, 3.8.4, and 3.8.5. The majority of the faults are always
detected in the first iteration of the control program, as occurred
in previous work [6]. However, a significant number remained
latent for a number of iterations. The average latency time of
those faults which remained undetected varied among the modules;
the significant data is summarized in Figure 3.8.6.
A significant result of this study was the wide variance in
latency parameters for each software module.
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PITCH
ATTITUDE
RATE FILTER
-5 FT
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+
6e
ELEVATOR
CE]MMAND
Block Diagram of a Simple Flight Control System
Figure 3.8.1
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00: 7B
01: BB
02: FC
03:75
04:A9
05:77
ST1:
PITCH CONTROLLER FOR TOY MICROPROCESSOR
INCLUDES ALTITUDE RATE HOLD AND FLARE
STA TEMP ; ZERO OUT
SUB TEMP ; THE ACCUMULATOR
INPUT AND PROCESS THE ALTITUDE DATA
ADD HPORT ;
STA H
SUB FIVEFT ;
STA HC
IMPLEMENT FLARE MODE
06:B7 SUB MC ;
07:F5 ADD H ;
08:B6 SUB HOLD ;
09:78 STA HDOT ;
0A: F8
0B: 7B
0C: FB
INPUT CURRENT ALTITUDE
STORE FOR ALTITUDE HOLD MODE
FORM FLARE ALTITUDE COMMAND
STORE IN FLARE COMMANDED ALTITUDE
0D: F7
0E: 7A
CLEAR ACCUMULATOR
GET ALTITUDE
COMPUTE ALTITUDE RATE
STORE ALTITUDE RATE
ADD HDOT ;
STA TEMP ;
ADD TEMP ;
ADD HC ;
STA DELHD2 ;
MULTIPLY HDOT BY TWO
THEN MULTIPLY BY FOUR
TO GET EQUIVALENT ALTITUDE
NOW ADD CURRENT FLARE ALTITUDE TO
GET ERROR AND STORE
Flight Controller Program Listing
Figure 3.8.2
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OF: BA
i0:F5
ii: 76
12:B6
13:F8
14: AA
15: 7B
16: FB
17: 7B
18: FB
19:79
ALTITUDE RATE FILTER UPDATE
SUB DELHD2 ;
ADD H
STA HOLD ;
CLEAR ACCUMULATOR
GET ALTITUDE
STORE IN FILTER STATE VARIABLE
IMPLEMENT ALTITUDE RATE MODE
SUB HOLD ;
ADD HDOT ;
SUB HDOTC ;
STA TEMP ;
ADD TEMP ;
STA TEMP ;
ADD TEMP ;
STA DELHDI ;
CLEAR ACCUMULATOR
GET ALTITUDE RATE
COMPUTE ALTITUDE RATE ERROR
NOW
MULTIPLY
BY
FOUR
STORE ALTITUDE RATE ERROR
Flight Controller Program Listing
( Continued )
Figure 3.8.2
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IA: B9
IB: F5
IC: EB
1D: 25
IE: 7B
IF: BB
20:F9
MODAL LOGIC
SUB DELHDI ;
ADD H
ADD H40 ;
BNO FLLOOP ;
STA TEMP
SUB TEMP
ADD DELHDI
21: FD OUT1: ADD
22: 7E STA
23: BE SUB
24:00 BNO
25: 7B FLLOOP: STA
26: BB SUB
27: FA ADD
28:21 BNO
29:05 FIVEFT DC
2A: 0C HDOTC DC
2B: 57 H40 DC
PITCH INNER LOOP
TPORT
DEPORT
DEPORT
ST1
TEMP
TEMP
DELHD2
OUT1
ROM CONSTANTS FOR PITCH
5
12
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CLEAR ACCUMULATOR
GET CURRENT ALTITUDE
FIND OUT IF OVER 40 FEET
NO, IN FLARE MODE
CLEAR ACCUMULATOR
COMMAND IS ALTITUDE RATE ERROR
ADD TO PITCH SIGNAL
SEND OUT TO ELEVATOR
CLEAR ACCUMULATOR
LOOP AGAIN
CLEAR ACCUMULATOR
COMMAND IS FLARE COMMAND
GO OUTPUT TO ELEVATOR
FIVE FOOT BIAS FOR FLARE
ALTITUDE RATE COMMAND
FORTY FOOT SWITCH POINT
Flight Controller Program Listing
( Continued )
Figure 3.8.2
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RAM VARIABLES AND MEMORY MAPPED I/O
35 ORG 53
35:00 H DC 0 ;
36:O0 HOLD DC 0 ;
37:00 HC DC 0 ;
38:00 HDOT DC 0 ;
39:00 DELHDI DC 0 ;
3A: 00 DELHD2 DC 0 ;
3B: 00 TEMP DC 0 ;
3C: 00 HPORT DC 0 ;
3D: 00 TPORT DC 0 ;
3E: 00 DEPORT DC 0 ;
ALTITUDE
OLD ALTITUDE FOR RATE FILTER
FLARE VARIABLE
COMPUTED ALTITUDE RATE
FLARE ERROR
ALTITUDE RATE ERROR
FOR CLEARING ACCUMULATOR
ALTITUDE MEMORY MAPPED INPUT
PITCH MEMORY MAPPED INPUT
ELEVATOR MEMORY MAPPED OUTPUT
NO ERRORS DETECTED
Flight Controller Program Listing
( Continued )
Figure 3.8.2
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Latency Distribution for the Vertical Speed Program Only
Figure 3.8.3
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FAULTS
70a
ITERATIONS UNTIL DETECTION
Latency Distribution for the Flare Program Only
Figure 3.8.4
99
FAULTS
! |00
• !
i
ITERATIONS UNTIL DETECTION
Latency Distribution for the Modal Logic Only
Figure 3.8.5
lO0
COMPARISON OF RESULTS FOR DIFFERENT PROGRAMS RUN ON THE SIMULATOR
VERTICAL FLARE MODAL
SPEED LOGIC
SIMPLE LOOP
(PREVIOUS REPORT)
PERCENT FAULTS 84.8
DETECTED
AVERAGE DETECT.
TIME (ITER.)
PERCENT SIMILAR 21.0
FAULTS
NO. FAULTS NEVER 275
OETECTEO
NO. FAULTS OET. 936
EVERY ITER.
NO. FAULTS DET. 118
IN 2 ITERS.
NO. FAULTS DET. 54
IN 3 ITERS.
84.33 82.5 79.8
II.00 5.05 14.8 4.18
21.1 38.6 7.0
283 314 351
831 784 829
168 94 220
116 87 49
Figure 3.8.6
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3.9 Effects of Modal Chanqe on the Reliability
of Systems with Latent Faults
In order to evaluate the probability of system failure in a
processing system running a particular program, it is necessary to
combine the results of the previous two sections. Consider the
Markov diagram for a triplex system given in Figure 3.3.1. Rather
than characterizing fault latency by a single propagation rate G,
one may expand the Markov model to include more latency classes as
defined in section 3.8. A Markov model of a triplex system with
two latency classes is given in Figure 3.9.1. The process can be
continued to a larger number of latency classes. However, as the
number of latency classes increases, the number of states of the
Markov diagram also increases, and the model becomes difficult to
solve. Hence, it may be more feasible to consolidate latency
classes when the latency times of the faults contained in each
class are close in magnitude.
Once a Markov model has been constructed for a particular
system architecture, it is possible to use this model to analyze
the probability of system failure in a multi-phase mission. Many
missions require the system to run a particular portion of the
operational flight program for one phase of the flight mission,
then switch to another portion of the OFP for some other phase.
This modal changing of the OFP which occurs at phase change of the
mission has a marked effect on system reliability.
Let P(t) represent a vector of state occupancy probabilities
for the Markov model, where the size of P corresponds to the number
of states in the model. For a particular phase of the mission,
denoted by i, it is possible to define a matrix G i that represents
the transition rates among the states of the model so that
d P
--- = G i P.
d t
(3.9.1)
It is possible to solve (3.9.1) for the transition matrix ¢i that
relates the state occupancy probabilities at any time t to the
state occupancy at time t o yielding
P(t) = ¢i(t,t0) P(t0). (3.9.2)
Consider a two phase mission. At the beginning of the first phase,
it is assumed that all processors are functioning properly, which
implies one particular Markov state with probability one. For
convenience, let this starting state be the first element of P so
that
P(0) = ( i, 0, 0, 0, ... , 0).
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At a particular time tl phase one ends, and the occupancy
probabilities are therefore
P(tl) = _i(ti,0) P(0).
When the system changes mode, GI changes to G 2 and _I changes to
_ However, the state occupancy probabilities P at the end of
phase one do not represent the state occupancy probabilities at the
beginning of phase two. This is because the states of the Markov
model which represent latency are based on the latency class of the
faults which have occurred, which itself is a function of the
program being executed. In other words, while the fault stays the
same when the mode changes, the latency class which characterizes
it may change. As an example, a fault that was not detectable by
the program in phase one may become detectable by a program in
phase two. It is necessary to compute the probability of
migration among fault classes when mode transition occurs. This is
done in a very straightforward manner by using the same fault set
for examining each mode. One can compute the probability that a
fault in a particular class in phase one is in some other class in
phase two, and construct a switching matrix S. It is only slightly
more complex to construct a matrix Q that relates the state
occupancies at the end of phase one to the state occupancies at the
beginning of phase two, based on S and the definition of states in
the Markov diagram.
Let P'(tl) be the state occupancy probabilities at the
beginning of phase two. Then
P' (tl) = Q P(t I)
and
p(t2) = _2(t2,tl) p, (tl) (3.9.3)
gives the state occupancy probabilities at the end of phase two,
and hence the probability of system failure of the mission.
As an example, consider the following mission flown by the
flight controller defined in section 3.3:
- Vertical speed mode from take-off to destination for a flight
time of approximately one hour, and
- Flare mode upon arrival at destination for a time of
approximately ten seconds.
Some latency class data for each phase of the mission is given in
Figures 3.9.2 and 3.9.3. A switching matrix S was constructed from
the simulation data, and is given in Figure 3.9.4. Examining the
switching matrix, two interesting points come to light:
- the matrix is not as strongly diagonal as might be expected,
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- a significant number of faults transition from never detected to
always detected.
The data in this matrix was used to construct a matrix Q, and the
Markov model was solved for the two phase mission. The results can
be summarized as follows:
Condition
No latency effects
Vertical Speed Mode only
Probability of system failure
1.01 x 10 .9
1.46 x 10 .9
Entire flight mission 30.36 x 10 .9
The above data supports the hypothesis that there is a
significant migration of faults from one class to another during
mode switching. CERTAIN FAULTS WHICH MAY BE UNDETECTABLE UNDER A
PARTICULAR MODE MAY BECOME DETECTABLE WHEN THE MODE CHANGES, SUCH
AS:
- memory addressing faults (to the memory containing the new
mode), and
- other hardware not exercised by the previous mode.
THESE FAULTS MAY COLLECT AND BECOME LATENT FOR LONG PERIODS OF TIME
PRIOR TO MODE CHANGE. Thus, mode switching may be the most
significant contributor to fault latency, and hence to degrading
system reliability.
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G " GOOD P;_OCESSOR
I • BAD PROCZSSOR
L 1 " PROCESSOR WITH CLASS I LATENT FAULT
L 2 " PROCESSOR WITH CLASS 2 LATENT FAULT
" FAULT RATE OF A SINGLE PROCESSOR
C " PROBABILITY THAT A FAULT IS DETECTED IMMEDIATELY
6 " PROBABILITY THAT TWO LATENT FAULTS RESULT
IN THE SAME ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
r] . PROPAGATION RATE OF LATENT FAULT CLASS l
r 2 - PROPAGATION RATE OF LATENT FAULT CLASS 2'
(PARTIAL DIAGRAM DASHED LINES ARE CONTINUED)
Markov Model of a Triplex System With Two Latency Classes
Figure 3.9.1
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FAULTS DETECTED
AVERAGE DETECTION TIME
SIMILAR FAULTS
FAULTS DET
FAULTS DET
FAULTS OET
FAULTS OET
FAULTS DET
FAULTS DET
EVERY ITERATION
IN 2 ITERS.
IN 3 ITERS.
IN 4 ITERS.
IN 5 ITERS.
IN 6 ITERS.
868%
8 79 ITERATIONS
224%
44 1 _
103%
142%
34%
25%
30%
Vertical Speed Mode Latency Parameters
Figure 3.9.2
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FAULTS DETECTED
AVERAGE DETECTION TIME
SIMILAR FAULTS
FAULTS DET
FAULTS OET
FAULTS OET
FAULTS OET
FAULTS DET
FAULTS DET
EVERY ITERATION
IN 2 ITERS.
IN 3 ITERS.
IN 4 ITERS.
IN 5 ITERS.
IN 6 ZTERS.
84.33
5 05 ITERATIONS
21 I _
49 1 _
99 _
6 9 _
3 3 _
20 _
Flare Mode Latency Parameters
Figure 3.9.3
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11TER.
2 ITER.
3 ITER.
4 ITER.
5 ITER.
N
E
V
E
R
9205
0452
0
0
0
0
0
A 1
L
W I
A T
Y E
S R
0389 .1234
7960 .5489
0703 .1361
0820 .0723
0047 .0681
0 .0213
0 .0298
2
I
T
E
R
0384
0256
3589
1025
0256
1538
0128
3
I
T
E
R
0961
1153
0384
1538
2500
0
1731
4
Z
T
E
R
0
0
0
2000
2400
0
0
5
I
T
E
R
.0
4883
0930
0
0
0
0
Latency Class Switching Matrix S from Vertical Speed to Flare
Figure 3.9.4
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4. SOFTWARE RELIABILITY EVALUATION USING SIMULATION
4.1 Introduction
A significant problem in designing fault tolerant computer
systems is to insure that generic failures, such as those caused by
design errors, do not occur. Design errors cannot be detected by
comparison monitoring techniques, and, when excited, can result in
"single point" system failures. Engineers have gained considerable
experience in processor design, and good engineering practices can
reduce hardware design errors to an acceptable level. Software,
however, poses a significantly harder problem. The focus of the
following work is on delivering error free software to a particular
reliability level; more specifically, validating the reliability of
software that will be used in a highly reliable computer system.
One application of fault tolerant computer systems occurs in
the avionics industry, when a processor complex is used to control
the aircraft. If the application of the processor complex is such
that its failure implies loss of control of the aircraft, it is
termed flight critical. The software that controls the aircraft is
termed the Operational Flight Program (OFP), and in a flight
critical system the OFP must operate without degrading the
reliability level of the hardware upon which it runs.
Reliability analysis of electronic systems is based on the
premise that components fail in a random manner when exposed to the
stresses and strains of normal operation. The failure rate of each
component is often assumed constant, and values can be determined
by collecting field data. Moreover, two identical components
subject to the same environmental conditions fail independently.
Complex systems can be modeled as a combination of simpler
components. However, software faults are not component failures
per se. Software never deteriorates with age; rather all faults
result from design errors that have remained latent through the
verification and validation phases. During system usage, these
errors are subject to random excitation, possibly resulting in
system failures.
Before an OFP can be used as a component of a flight critical
application, it is required to associate with that program a
probability of failure. Because of the nature of software, it
would be more correct to say that the probability of excitation of
existing design errors is required. In this sense, software errors
are like latent hardware faults, and it seemed reasonable to
explore whether techniques used to measure the effects of hardware
fault latency on reliability can be used to measure software
reliability. Measurement of hardware fault latency was discussed
previously herein.
To test this hypothesis, an OFP was obtained that controlled an
aircraft during autoland at ILS category III facilities, a flight
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critical application. The OFP was meant to run on a triplex or
quad computer architecture to ensure that the hardware's system
failure rate was on the order of 10 .9 per hour. It was assumed that
the OFP had already gone through the verification phase; the
methodology was formulated for its validation. A reliability model
of the programs execution characteristics was developed, and the
program itself was instrumented to measure the parameters of this
model. When the validation test was complete, a reliability number
was generated.
The procedure was then evaluated for its ease of use,
predicted execution time for larger software programs, and ability
to be automated. The outcome of the test showed the method to be
a feasible approach for validation of critical software.
Previous Work on Software Reliability
Many researchers have proposed software reliability models
[23,24,25]; however, most of the models have been based on
cumulative failure data obtained during normal system operation.
For critical software, this is to be avoided, as a single software
failure could become catastrophic. Most models assume a particular
distribution to predict the time between failures, and model
parameters are estimated from the data. If the past failure
history fits the model well, it can be used to predict the
occurrence of future failures. Models have been constructed
assuming the occurrence of failure follows the binomial
distribution, the Weibull distribution, and the Poisson
distribution; a good summary of the different models is given in
[23] and also in [24].
Other researchers have dealt with measurement of errors during
the validation phase, more similar to the problem dealt with here.
Specifically, Nelson [26] has suggested measuring reliability from
random excitation of the software. Specifically, Nelson suggests
running the software with a series of n inputs, randomly chosen
from the input domain E needed to make a run. The random sampling
is done according to the probability of occurrence of the inputs in
normal operation. If n_ is the number of inputs that resulted in
software failures, then R = (l-n_/n) is the reliability of the
software. Ramamoorthy and Bastani [27] have increased the
complexity of the model to include probabilistic equivalence
classes, a concept which takes into account the complexity of the
program.
Fault Tolerant programming schemes exist, such as N version
programming [28], which purport to increase the reliability of the
software using hardware principles of redundancy management.
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4.2 Fliqht Critical Software Requirements
It is necessary that the failure rate of flight critical
systems meet government specifications, i.e., , 10-9 per flight
hour for a commercial system and , 10-7 per flight hour for a
military system, and that both the hardware and software that
compromise the system must together meet these criteria. Further,
it is necessary to demonstrate to the applicable certifying
authority that the resulting system indeed will attain the required
reliability.
System certification usually implies a combination of flight
tests and computer studies. Computer studies can show simulated
operation in normal and aberrant environments, demonstrating that
the unfailed system will operate correctly in the expected
environments to the required probability. Component failures may
then be simulated according to their probability of occurrence to
demonstrate that the system either recovers in an acceptable manner
to common failures, or the combination of component failures
necessary to induce an equipment failure is sufficiently unlikely
as not to adversely affect the probability of system failure. The
final result of these computer studies is an estimated probability
of system failure during the intended mission of the aircraft.
Flight testing is expensive, and it is not possible to collect
enough flight data to form a statistical basis for validation.
Flight testing can check the computer model used in the simulation
studies by demonstrating that the system operates correctly in
normal usage, and operates in the manner predicted under a small
number of induced failures.
Certifying that the system meets its reliability criteria is
usually termed validation testing. Validation is independent of
system development, and represents an acceptance test of the final
product. When the system is relatively simple and the required
reliability is low, certification can be done strictly at the
systems level, i.e., sufficient testing of the entire system can be
performed to form a statistically valid sample of system operation.
However, when the system is complex and the required reliability is
high, the system validation can be decomposed into a number of
tests that exercise different portions of the system, the results
being mathematically combined to obtain the overall reliability.
One such decomposition is to validate separately the hardware
and the software. This makes sense, because many reliability
modeling procedures are available for hardware [11,12] which reduce
the complexity of the required tests (i.e., decomposition into
components and evaluating the component reliabilities and their
interrelationships). The same type of validation testing should be
done on the software.
To perform software validation testing, one must prepare a
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test that exercises every possible set of inputs that the system
might encounter. This is clearly impossible. One must construct
a test that will exercise enough of the possible environments and
demonstrate that the probability of occurrence of untested
scenarios is sufficiently small so as not to adversely affect
system reliability.
Consider that software for flight critical applications is
usually relatively small compared to, say, navigation software.
The operating environment for critical software is well defined -
it is specified in advance under exactly what conditions the system
must operate satisfactorily. Description of the environment is
often available in government documents, such as FAA advisory
circulars [29,30].
Because of the criticality of the application, it is necessary
to perform reliability estimation during validation testing, rather
than as a consequence of flight experience. However, the total
amount of computer and flight time required to validate the
software must be "reasonable" - that is, time to validate must be
sufficiently small that the software could be revalidated if the
code is changed. The methodologies described herein should meet
these goals.
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4.3 Typical Programming Errors
Before discussing the methodology itself, it is instructive to
consider errors that are typical of what one might encounter in a
program. The intent is not to classify programming errors, but
rather to examine a sampling of errors one might find in practice
and consider how the validation technique would test for each.
- erroneous calculation of a control law
It is possible that, during coding, the design specification
was misinterpreted and algorithms were implemented that were
different from the requirements. Errors could be as simple as
changing a constant multiplier by a small amount, or as complicated
as omitting (or adding) logic paths. It is most likely that the
errors would be in some sense small, or they would have been
uncovered during verification testing. These errors might cause a
negligible change in system operation during most environmental
conditions. It is possible that, under the right conditions,
catastrophic changes in system performance could occur. It is also
possible that these changes might never affect system performance
in more than a minimal manner.
- invalid reference to a memory location
It is possible that a statement used to test the value of a
memory location could refer to the wrong memory location. Many
tests are such that they are always (or rarely) satisfied. In this
case, if the erroneous memory location tests the same way as the
correct memory location most of the time, the error would be hard
to detect. However, certain conditions might cause the test
outcome to change, and this error will be activated.
Consider as an example, a test for maximum allowable value of
a variable before its transmittal to the processor output. If the
test references the wrong variable, and the incorrectly referenced
variable is below the maximum value, the test will give the correct
outcome whenever the correct variable is also below the maximum
value. If the correct variable reaches its maximum value very
seldom, this may be a hard error to detect. However, going over
the maximum allowable value might cause the system to operate
incorrectly and result in a catastrophic failure.
It is also possible that this incorrect reference could be to
a memory location outside of the scope of the module. In this
case, the error might be benign for all conditions the system might
incur; however, recompiling and relinking the program might cause
the error to become catastrophic for a number of conditions.
Further, the program might be recompiled and/or relinked for
problems that were not related to the module containing the error.
- overflow or divide by zero not properly handled in certain
situations
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It is possible that an exception handling routine does not
operate correctly under certain conditions. The exception handler
is usually entered from a variety of calling locations, in some
designs activated by interrupt and in other designs by subroutine
calls interspersed in the code. The nature of exceptions implies
that they occur infrequently, hence the code to support them may be
exercised very infrequently. The above conditions imply that any
problems within the exception handler may remain latent. The
absence of an exception handler also causes data dependent errors
in other lines of the code.
- compiler/assembler not properly translating source code
It is possible that the compiler used to translate source code
is not operating properly. When improper operation results in
immediate failure of the resulting object code, this problem will
be corrected immediately. When subtle errors occur, such as an
incorrect interpretation of the compiler specifications in certain
situations, these errors may remain latent.
Consider, as an example, a misinterpretation of the compiler
specification on the execution of FORTRANtype "DO" loops when the
index variable is less then or equal to zero. The
misinterpretation could be either by the applications programmer or
the compiler writer; reliability wise the result is the same. A
data dependent error is created that may remain latent depending on
the operating environment.
- improper timing of control code
It is possible that, under certain conditions, computations may
not be finished in a major computational frame. A background task
may access a variable used by a foreground task; the value of the
variable is now a function of the program timing. Timing
dependencies may create problems that only occur infrequently,
creating latent errors.
- improper interpretation of the system requirements document
It is possible that, in translating the system requirements
document through the many steps that result in code generation,
errors were made. Good engineering practices will reduce the
number of errors that actually appear in the code; however, subtle
errors may remain. It is important to note that the cause of
improper system operation often can only be blamed arbitrarily on
one particular phase of the development process, i.e. even when the
error is fully understood, it is not fully clear that it is due to
poor design, poor coding, or incomplete specifications.
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4.4 Development of the Methodoloqy
Software does not deteriorate with age; if a program
encounters a given set of input conditions, it will present the
same output sequences repeatedly. If one could validate a flight
program by presenting all possible sequences of input conditions to
the software, and verify that the output sequences are correct,
then the software is, by definition, error free! Clearly, this is
an impossible task.
When validation is imperfect, software errors remain in the
program and become latent. Latent errors can be excited by the
right combination of environmental factors. If these environmental
factors can never occur, then the software operation is still
completely reliable. When these environmental factors do occur,
the software fails. Then, the reliability of the software is
equivalent to the probability that environmental factors do not
occur that will excite latent errors. The fact that a certain
release of software has flown successfully for a certain length of
time implies a certain reliability for that particular release of
the software, as it implies a probability of excitation of any
latent errors.
What constitutes correct operation of the software? Errors
might occur that cause the software to deviate from what the system
designers had in mind, but the software might still acceptably
control the aircraft. Therefore, the following definition is
proposed of correct software operation:
Correct operation of the software is implied by an
acceptable aircraft system in which the software is
embedded.
If the aircraft can be shown to operate acceptably (as defined in
applicable flight documents and specifications) for all possible
environmental conditions, then, by definition, the software is
operating correctly.
It is apparent that some of the faults mentioned in the
previous section may be present, and the software will operate
correctly. If the environment in which the software is to operate
is known a priori, then the probability of the software not
operating correctly is a function of the probability of an
environmental change that excites an error, or the error's latency
time. More specifically,
- most faults with small latency times are uncovered during
verification testing,
- if the latency time is sufficiently high, the error has a minor
effect on reliability, and
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- faults with moderate latency times have the worst effect on
reliability.
Of course, the interpretation of what is a small, moderate, or high
latency time is necessary to performing an evaluation of system
reliability. Previous studies with hardware latency have shown
this concept to be viable for failure analysis [17].
Note that by this definition of software reliability, if the
environment changes significantly from the environment the system
was designed for, the reliability of the software changes
accordingly. Further, the reliability of a new release of software
cannot be predicated on the reliability of the old release.
One may argue that the proposed definition of software
reliability encompasses failure issues that are more correctly on
the system level, and may include hardware design errors, system
design errors, etc. It is the contention here that, in many cases,
it is impossible to pinpoint whether an error is truly a "software
error", a poor hardware design that is intolerant of its software,
or a control algorithm that is hard to implement. In any case, the
important requirement is a system reliability requirement with
software embedded.
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4.5 Mathematical Development of Software Reliability Models
Hardware reliability is estimated by dividing it into modules,
and breaking the modules down into components. A mathematical
model of the interconnection of the components and modules is
constructed. Component reliability may be obtained from handbook
data, or laboratory experiments, and the mathematical model may be
evaluated to obtain the overall system reliability.
Software reliability modeling proceeds in a similar manner.
A decomposition into modules for a program is normally part of the
software design phase. A line of code will be used as an entity
analogous to components in hardware; a line of code is represented
by a typical line of a FORTRAN program (or other higher order
language).
One might question whether the definition of this entity is
too loose. A complete operational flight program might consist of
a single line of FORTRAN code such as FLY THE PLANE, while the same
program at an assembly language level-might consist of a few
thousand lines of code, each doing a significantly smaller
operation. The definition of exactly what constitutes a line of
code is not critical to the method, as the reliability of lower
level lines may be easier to compute with greater accuracy than
those of lines which imply a higher computational level.
Analyzinq a Line of Code
A typical FORTRAN line of code, other than a subroutine call,
associates a value to a variable based on some computations. For
simplicity, it is assumed that a sinqle output quantity is
associated with each line. This is not considered confining, as a
program line that manipulates two output quantities can be modeled
as two lines of code. Each programmed variable can be represented
as a discrete outcome of a computation contained in the set
J = ( i, 2, ..., _ ) (4.5.1)
where N represents the number of different values that can be
represented by a variable on this processor, i.e., 216 for a sixteen
bit processor and 232 for a thirty two bit processor.
Each line of code can be represented mathematically by the
function
Yk = _k(Yl,Y2, • • " 'Yn) (4.5.2)
where Yk E J is the output of the kth line,
Yl, Y2, "'', Yn _ J are n quantities that the kth line of
code uses as inputs, and
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¢: N n _ n is the mapping represented by the code line.
Definition
An elementary error occurs when one member of the input
space of ¢ is not correctly mapped onto its corresponding
output.
The probability of an elementary error resulting in an
erroneous computation is then the probability of that elementary
error being excited. If only one elementary error exists at, say,
input sequence i E n n , and its excitation causes a system failure,
then
P (error) = p (excitation) -- p(ei) (4.5.3)
where e i is the event that the ith input sequence presents itself
sometime during a single operating interval of the system (such as
a landing, mission, etc.), and p(ei) is the probability associated
with event e i. The situation becomes a little more complex when
there are multiple elementary programming errors in the line. If
there are n elementary programming errors in a line, represented by
input sequence events _i, i=l,...,n, _i _ Nn, then
P(excitation)
n n
= p( U _i ) < _" P(_i) (4.5.4)
i=l i=l
To verify correct design, one must show that all combinations
of inputs to the line of code results in the proper output. This
is clearly an impractical task, and unnecessary because:
- each input _ has associated with it an expected region of
operation, significantly reducing the input space for the line,
- the mapping for each input combination is not independent;
rather they follows the algebraic rules as stated in (4.5.2).
Therefore, errors will not associated with input combinations but
rather with the algebraic rules of the code line.
The foregoing points significantly limit the number of
independent errors that might be associated with each line. I_tt
therefore seems unfeasible to associate an infinite number of
independent errors with each line, but rather some small finite
number of errors associated with the structure of the line.
Definition
A proqramminq error occurs when a single factor causes a
region of the input space of ¢ to map incorrectly to its
output. Multiple programming errors are independent
events.
Each programming error implies a set of associated elementary
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errors; conversely an elementary error may be implied by more than
one programming error. A programming error may be represented by
the set of n elementary errors that it implies, i.e.,
_i = (al, a2, "'', an) (4.5.5)
where the index i enumerates the m different programming errors
that may be associated with this particular line. Then the
probability of error for each line is
m m
P(excitation) = P ( U fi [ U ej ] ) < Z P(fi) Z P(ej)
i=l J_i i=l J6_i
m
T. S(fi) P(_i)
i=l
(4.5.6)
where f. is the event signifying that programming error i has
occurred, and S(fi) is a function either one or zero.
In certain cases, it may be possible to identify analytically
all the possible errors. Then, a test that checks for the presence
of each error can be constructed. A proper test set can show that
S(f_) is zero for all m errors, P(error) = P(excitation) = 0 from
(4.5.6), and the line is correct. This is the basis for proof of
correctness techniques.
Considering the types of errors that might occur, in most
cases, both analytical identification of errors and test generation
is not practical. However, if the number of possible errors in the
line could be identified along with some information about the
elementary error set _i associated with each error, statistical
testing techniques could be used test the state of S(fi).
The M Error Model
One approach to measuring P(excitation) for each line is to
assume a model for (4.5.6) whose parameter are known or can be
measured. The model used here contains exactly M possible errors,
all having an equal probability of excitation, i.e. it is assumed
that
P (excitation) <
M 1 M
S(fi) P(_i) .... _ S(f_).
i=l M i=l
(4.5.v)
It is noted that P(excitation) has a binomial distribution, i.e.,
either an error in the line is excited, or it is no not. Consider
a validation test that exercises the line of code in a random
manner. The probability under the M error model that the
validation test encounters no errors for E executions of the line
and encounters an error the E+I time the line is executed is
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P(error on E+I) [i.0 - P(excitation) ]E P(excitation)
(4.5.8)
It is easy to show that, when the relation
1
E > - i,
P (excitation)
holds, then P(error on E+I) is maximized when P(excitation) is
minimized. From (4.5.7), P(excitation) is minimized under the M
error model when one assumes that all the S(fi) equals zero but
one, yielding P(excitation) = I/M.
It is noted that, when right side of (4.5.8) were multiplied
by E, it represents a binomial distribution. When E is very large,
a binomially distributed random variable can approximated by a
Poisson distribution, yielding
P(error on E+I)
- P(excitation) E
= e P(excitation)
= P(error/excitation) P(excitation). (4.5.9)
Partitioninq the M Error Model into Reqions
In many applications, the complexity of each line of code is
such that the data gained from measuring its probability of
excitation for the M error model is not sufficient to characterize
its execution characteristics. The line of code may be executed
continuously, but the computations involved may differ for each
execution, i.e. the assumption of equiprobable excitation for the
M errors may not be correct. When this is the case, execution
statistics can be improved by assuming that the line of code is
composed of L regions of operation, and excitation anywhere within
a region follows the previously defined error model. Furthermore,
it is assumed that the errors are evenly dispersed among the
regions.
The output of each line of code is divided into L equally
spaced regions of operation in this model. While it would be
preferred to divide the input space of each line into regions, this
is infeasible. Since the input of most lines of code is obtained
from the output of previous lines, any variable that takes
infrequent excursions could possibly excite latent errors as an
input to succeeding lines. The expression for the probability of
an error occurring after E executions of a line of code is
P(error on E+I)
L
= Z
R=I
- ( E R L )/M
e P(excitation) (4.5.10)
where E R is the number of executions of the line yielding output
values of the line within region number R.
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4.6 Reliability Model for an Operational Fllqht Proqram
The probability of failure of an operational flight program
can be obtained by summing the probabilities of error for each of
the N lines of the program using the conditional relation
N
P(failure) = Z P(error/excitation) P(excitation). (4.6.1)
K=I
Let the program be subjected to a randomly generated validation
test during which no software failures are recorded, and let a
particular line of code be executed EK times during that test.
Then (4.5.9) can be used to calculate P(error/excitation).
P(excitation) in (4.6.1) is now the probability of excitation
of the line of code during a typical flight. It is assumed that
the probability of encountering any particular environmental
condition is constant from flight to flight; mathematically, the
hazard function is constant. This implies an exponential
distribution whose hazard function is the execution rate of the
line of code. The execution rate of the line of code can be
measured during the validation test. If the duration of a
particular flight scenario is TF, execution rate is W, then the
probability of excitation during that flight is
-WKT F
P(excitation) = (I - e ). (4.6.2)
Before the program is subject to validation, verification
testing has been performed. Verification testing exercises each
line of the program against the software specification; many errors
are detected and corrected during this phase. Verification testing
cannot guarantee that the program works as a whole within the
computer system; this is the function of validation. However,
verification testing will be considered an independent check of the
program for errors. The probability of an error existing after
program verification will be termed the verification coverage,
represented by C T. Then the probability of failure given in
(4.6.1) can be modified to account for the verification test, and
from (4.5.9) and (4.6.2)
P(failure) = C T
N
K=I
-EK/M -W K T F
e ( 1.0 - e ). (4.6.3)
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4.7 Validation b7 Simulation versus Fliqht Testln-
In order to obtain a statistically significant sample for
evaluating (4.6.3), a large number amount of data would have to be
collected with instrumented software. It is infeasible to do this
during the flight test phase; rather, a large number of simulation
runs can be made. Simulation alone cannot fully validate the
program because some errors may be present that can only be
activated in a flight environment. One may question how much
flight testing should be done as part of the overall validation
scheme.
One approach to evaluating software reliability from flight
test involves estimating what fraction of errors are never excited
during simulation testing, but will be excited during flight. Call
this fraction PF. Then the probability of failure of the software
due to errors that will only be excited during flight test is
P(failure) = C T
N -wK T, /PF -wK %
Z e ( 1.0- e
K=I
) (4.v.i)
where T T is the number of hours of flight test without incident,
and W K was obtained from the simulation phase.
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4.8 Implementinq Procedure for the Methodoloqy
To implement validation testing using this model, one must
perform repeated simulations of the system under sufficient
operating conditions to generate statistical data to evaluate
(4.6.3) and (4.7.1). For an avionics system, this can be done by
simulating the aircraft, its environment, and the hardware
interfacing the processors to the aircraft. Simulation in this
context could be entirely contained in a computer simulation
package, or could be achieved using a combination of flight
hardware (processors, sensors, actuators, etc.) connected to a
simulation of airframe dynamics.
The simulation flies repeated "mission segments" using the OFP
under test, each mission segment under a different set of
environmental conditions. A mission segment could be a take-off,
landing, following a specific terrain, etc. The specification of
what constitutes a mission segment comes from the design document
for the particular system. Many mission segments involve execution
of a particular portion of code for a certain period of time, then
switching to some other portion of the program for the next
segment. Latency times within one simulated mission segment are
insignificant when compared to the latency time that may accumulate
over many executions of a mission segment. Statistics are gathered
each time a mission segment is run indicating what regions of each
variable's output space were exercised. The probability of
excitation for a particular region of a variable is its probability
of excitation during a single running of a mission segment.
The methodology for performing the validation is as follows:
- simulate a large number of repetitions of the mission segments
being validated, changing the environmental conditions each time,
- choose environmental conditions by mapping randomly across high
and low probability scenarios,
- record the statistical results - results may be cumulative over
many different simulation instances (i.e., one can always perform
more simulations if required),
- insure that none of the simulated performance resulted in system
failure, and
- postprocess the statistics to obtain reliability numbers.
Additional Software Components Needed for Validation
To form the validation package, the following software
components were necessary in addition to the OFP:
- a simulation of a suitable airframe with dynamics to represent
the mode of flight controlled by the OFP,
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- inputs representing environmental changes that the aircraft
might encounter, such as winds, instrument noise, terrain
variation, etc.,
- a system monitor to insure that system operation does not
deviate from specifications, and
- a statistics gathering routine to measure raw data needed to
calculate parameters for (4.6.3) and (4.7.1).
The statistics gathering program is called after each program
line with the value of the output variable. This program compiles
the highest and lowest value attained by each variable, and passes
this data to the postprocessing program. In the case of subroutine
calls, it also divides statistics based on calling path. In this
manner each subroutine is treated statistically as if it were
in-line code.
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5. VALIDATION OF AN OPERATIONAL FLIGHT PROGRAM
5.1 Description of the Operational Flight Proqram
To test the proposed methodology, a small (200 line) FORTRAN
program was written to implement the pitch autoland mode of
operation. This OFP included an ILS glideslope coupler and a flare
mode based on sensed radar altitude. A simulation of a Boeing 707
airframe in landing configuration, with appropriate ground effects,
was used to model system dynamics.
Environmental changes were modeled as noise superimposed on the
system inputs, including
- wind turbulence,
- steady state winds,
- wind shear,
- instrument noise,
- landing guidance noise, and
- variation in runway characteristics.
Specifications for environmental changes were obtained from
applicable FAA documents, notably [29] and [30].
A system monitoring routine insured that
interest remained within bounds during simulation.
FAA document [30], the following boundaries
continuously
parameters of
According to
were checked
- normal acceleration within 1 G,
- pitch attitude less than i0 degrees,
- altitude deviation from glide path less than 20 feet,
while the following boundaries were checked after touchdown
- descent rate at touchdown is less than 5 feet/sec, and
- range from glide slope transmitter is less than 2000 feet.
If any of the above boundaries were violated, a catastrophic
failure of the software is assumed to have occurred, and the
software is invalid. If such a failure should have occurred, the
OFP would be repaired and the validation process started over
again.
The mission segment simulated for the validation test started
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at i000 feet with the aircraft flying straight and level. The OFP
guided the aircraft through capture of the ILS glideslope through
touchdown on the runway. The total duration of real time
simulated was approximately i00 seconds, depending on atmospheric
conditions. Because of limitations on the amount of computer
resources available to run the tests, the mission segment was
repeated only 600 times. During each simulation, 131 variables
were monitored in the OFP. A sample of the monitored code is shown
in Figure 5.1.1. While this did not provide enough data to
validate the software to flight critical levels, it did provide
enough data to evaluate the methodology.
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5.2 Results of the Study
The results of the 600 simulations of the mission segment were
recorded and analyzed by a postprocessor. To evaluate reliability,
it was assumed that the aircraft landed once per hour, and that the
OFP was verified to 95 % coverage before validation.
Table 5.2.1 shows the probability of computing values within
each of ten regions associated with a particular variable within
the OFP, along with the number of simulated landings which entered
that region of operation. The regional occupancy probability is
based on the relative probability of occurrence of each of the
conditions which caused the OFP to enter that region, which may not
be proportional to the number of simulated landings that entered
that region. In evaluating (4.6.3), it is noted that the
probability of occurrence is needed to evaluate W< while E K is the
number of simulated landings that entered the reglon.
The regional occupancy probability was computed for all
variables within the OFP and was tabulated. It revealed that a
large percentage of regions have a very high probability of
occupancy while a small number of regions had a very low
percentage. Few regions had occupancy probabilities in between.
The data is summarized in Table 5.2.2.
The M error model was evaluated setting M equal to 31, a
number chosen arbitrarily. The probability of failure measured by
the simulation was calculated to be 4.38 x 10 .4 while the
probabilit_ of failure measured by a I00 hour flight test would be
1.88 x 10"=under the assumption that 5 % of the errors could only
be found during flight test (PF equals .05). In order to assess
the dependence of the measured probability of failure on the
parameter M, a plot was made of this relationship, and is shown in
Figure 5.1.2.
The 600 simulation runs were performed on a MicroVAX computer
and took about I0 hours of computer time to complete. If a larger
member of the VAX computer family were used, the same results could
have been obtained in approximately 1 hour of computer time.
Examining (4.6.3), it is noted that P(error/excitation) is an
exponential function of -EK/M. Hence, when the regional mappings
don't change significantly, increasing the number of simulation
runs is equivalent to decreasing M. Figure 5.2.2 can then be used
to estimate the number of hours necessary to validate the software
to flight critical levels, in this case 60 hours of simulation
would validate the OFP to approximately 10 .9 probability of failure
under the M error model with M equals 31. While the 60 hours is
only an estimate, it is a feasible amount of computer time for a
validation effort.
During the 600 computer runs, one line of code was never
executed. Upon investigation, it was associated with a logical
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input, normally associated with failure recovery code, that was
never exercised. To properly validate this OFP, the process must
be repeated with this input properly simulated.
Conclusions
It was concluded that the methodology outlined is a feasible
approach to validating critical software. The computing resources
necessary to validate programs up to, say, a few thousand lines
would be large, but not infeasible, although it does not seem
practical to validate very large programs by this method.
Instrumentation of the software to be validated was straightforward
and could be easily automated.
An examination of the statistics produced during validation
can be used to point out those internal regions of operation seldom
used, and the code can be rewritten, or testing can be improved to
insure their reliability. The effects of a successful flight test
on reliability can be evaluated.
The method is dependent on the value of M assumed for the M
error model, and also on the value of PF assumed for flight test,
and more work is needed to establish suitable values for these
parameters. More work is also needed to verify the methodology
with large samples and larger programs.
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Region Boundaries Simulated Landings
Entering Region
Occupancy
Probability
-.27 -.20 33 .0272
-.20 -.13 477 .904
-.13 -.05 600 i.
-.05 .01 600 I.
.01 .07 600 i.
.07 .14 600 i.
.14 .20 575 .999
.20 .27 428 .966
.27 .33 22 .0143
.33 .40 1 .000155
Probability of Regional Occupancy for a Single Variable
Table 5.1.1
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Probability of Execution Percentage of
Regions
.000012
.0142
.0285
13.7
2.6
1.85
.942
.957
.971
> .985
13.4
2.06
6.61
59.5
Probability of Execution of Regions of Variables
Table 5.1.2
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CC
C
C
C
C
ROLL ANGLE INPUT
POINTS(3)=I.25*PHI
CALL MON(I,3,POINTS(3))
RADIO ALTIMETER
POINTS(4)=.5*HRA
CALL MON(I,4,POINTS(4))
IF(GSTRK) THEN
POINTS(5)=4.7
CALL MON(I,5,POINTS(5))
ELSE
POINTS(5)=IL.0
CALL MON(I,6,POINTS(5))
ENDIF
CALL LAG(POINTS(6),POINTS(5),5.,I.)
CALL MON(I,7,POINTS(6))
IF(HVALID) THEN
POINTS(7)=POINTS(4)
CALL MON(I,8,POINTS(7))
ELSE
POINTS97)=POINTS(6)
CALL MON(I,9,POINTS(7))
ENDIF
Sample of an Instrumented Program
Figure 5.1.1
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.25 35
Probability of Failure as a Function of M in the M Error Model
Figure 5.1.2
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6. VALIDATION OF THE LAUNCH INTERCEPTER CONDITION PROGRAM
6.1 Description of the Proqram Under Test
The Launch Interceptor Condition Program is a variation on the
operational flight program previously tested. The program
describes a decision process which takes as input a set of (up to
i00) radar points which might represent an incoming missile, or
might represent just random noise. By testing the points, the
program decides whether or not to launch an intercepting missile.
The program makes this decision by performing geometric
calculations on the radar tracking points provided. Fifteen
geometric tests are performed resulting in the generation of
fifteen logical variables which represent intermediate indicators
of whether or not a missile is present. These fifteen variables
are combined using a logical weighting matrix to yield an overall
answer of whether or not to fire the interceptor missile. The
logical weighting matrix is generated randomly so that the
characteristics of the program change from execution to execution
for testing purposes.
Three versions of the LIC program were provided by NASA:
- a gold version, with no errors
- a program with an error in the geometric calculations
- a program with an invalid use of the arccosine function
These programs were originally used in a test of the N version
methodology in which random sequences were generated representing
radar tracks. Outputs of the N versions were then compared to
uncover errors. However, the N version testing did not take into
account the design specifications of the software, i.e., the radar
tracks were not necessarily indicative of what the system would see
in "normal" operation.
Validation testing using the methodology described in section
4 proceeds by defining the input specifications. To simulate radar
tracking of an incoming missile, random numbers were used to
generate the following quantities which were then combined:
- background noise for the radar,
- missile status (whether or not one was present),
- trajectory of incoming missile (when one is present), and
- radar echoes.
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The radar track data was then fed to the LIC program using a single
assumed weighting matrix for all tests. The output of the LIC
program (launch or don't launch intercept missile) was compared to
the missile status. The program was considered to have failed when
it did not launch an intercept missile when a missile was present,
or launched a missile needlessly.
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6.2 Results of the Study
The Launch Intercept Condition program contained approximately
300 lines of code, and hooks were placed in the code to monitor the
usage of each line. Twelve thousand simulation runs were made,
and statistics were gathered.
A typical probability of regional occupancy for one of the
lines of code is shown in Figure 6.2.1, this being a line that was
frequently executed. Unfortunately, because of the nature of the
code, there were many lines of code that were executed
infrequently. This drastically reduces the overall reliability of
the software, as execution of these lines of code might result in
a software bug being uncovered. The overall probability of failure
of the GOLD module was calculated to be
P(failure) = .5 x 10 .3
The change in the probability of failure of the GOLD module as the
number of cases tested was increased is shown in Figure 6.2.2.
The invalid arccosine function error was excited using the
methodology. This was a data dependent error, and it was possible
to run the program with data that did not cause it to fail.
However, under the assumed input space,
P(excitation of invalid arccosine error) = .5 x 10 .2
The geometric calculation error was never excited in the
12,000 cases tested. From the large sample of input data it was
concluded that:
- the error does not adversely affect system performance, and
- the error may never be excited with the input simulation used.
Considering the shape of Figure 6.2.2 and the high probability of
failure of the GOLD module, the lack of detection of this error is
not surprising.
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MAINPROGRAM LINE NUMBER 19,EXECUTED 11,600TIMES
MINIMUM VALUE = 2,MAXIMUM VALUE = 89
PROBABILITY OF COMPUTING VALUES WITHIN EACH REGION
I 000,
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Typical Probabilities of Regional Occupancy for a Single Output
Figure 6.2.1
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7. A SIMULATION METHODOLOGY FOR EVALUATING THE EFFECTS OF SINGLE
EVENT UPSETS (SEUS)
7.1 Description of Sinole Even U DS_tS
New development in aircraft design will have a profound effect on the
performance and cost of operating an airplane, the use of composite materials for the
aircraft shell is very appealing because they are strong, yet light weight. Further, the
airframe can be designed to reduce the drag, even when such a design results in
deteriorated stability. Onboard computer systems acting as flight controllers can modify
the handling characteristics of the aircraft to acceptable level. The result is an aircraft
that performs well, and is cheaper to operate.
Computer chip technology has improved significantly, also. It is possible to build
more functionality on a single chip, hence reducing the size of avionics equipment.
However, the small thickness of the device and the high density of its circuitry make
shell aircraft provided electrical shielding; composite materials do not. The metal
cabinets which house an avionics computer may transients due to radiation may enter
at signal and power connectors. Lightning and electromagnetic interference (EMI)
represent possible radiation sources. Radiation effects may also be nuclear, even at
low altitudes. While the physics of each type of radiation is different, their effect on a
computer processing system is similar.
It is, of course, quite possible for high level radiation to cause permanent damage
to the computing complex. This is a function of hardware design, not to be addressed
here. It is a likely that even a mild dose of radiation will cause transient errors to occur
in the processors. Such transient errors are termed Single Event Upsets. From a
hardware standpoint, the processors are functionally capable of recovering from the
transient if the error propagation from the SEU can be identified and stopped. However,
if the SEU causes the software to malfunction, it may never recover.
Langley Research Center currently is investigating the susceptibility of an engine
controller to SEUs caused by lightning. An analytical reliability model of the controller is
described herein, which could be used as an aid for reliability prediction of this
controller, and to generalize the results of those investigations to other aircraft
controllers.
Recovery from an SEU
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It is not clear whether a single event will cause multiple
errors to be induced in a processor. If the upset affects only a
single processor of a redundant set, it is possible that detection
and isolation mechanisms will allow the system to recover from the
event. However, if the upset affects more than one processor,
disturbs the recovery algorithm, or affects a non-redundant
processor, the system may not recover.
It is also possible that the event may never propagate to a
point where it causes an error in controller operation. Should the
upset never propagate to a latch or register within the CPU, it may
never affect program execution.
Even if the event reaches a register, that register may not be
used by the software at that instant. If this is the case, the
system will again recover spontaneously from the upset.
Carrying the argument further, even if the event changes a
software variable, the software may treat that change as noise, and
still recover. However, if the software does fail, can it fail in
such a way as to defeat the detection and recovery scheme?
Remember, most detection and recovery schemes were designed to work
correctly based on the assumption that faults occur solely due to
component ageing.
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?.2 Assoclatinq a Probability of Failure with an SEU
While the propagation and recovery mechanisms of SEU's are of
interest to system designers, it is the probability of system
failure due to SEU's that is of interest to the reliability
engineer. Consider a single processor that experiences an SEU.
When the SEU causes the processor to cease functioning, (branch to
a bad ROM address, etc.) the watchdog timer will signal the system
recovery mechanism. However, there is evidence [31] that in many
instances, only a single bit in a single register will be affected,
allowing the processor to continue executing instructions. It
would be of interest to estimate the probability of failure (due to
the SEU) when either a single bit, or a small number of bits, are
affected.
Consider a reliability model in which the fault propagates
hierarchically from the gate level to the system level. It is
possible that recovery occurs at a particular level, halting error
propagation to higher levels. Then the probability of recovery at
each higher level is actually a conditional probability, i.e., the
probability of recovery at that level given that the error has
propagated to that level. If
Pgate level recovery Probability that the error never
propagates from the affected gate
to a register or latch
Pre1_ister level recovery Probability that the error never
propagates from a register to a
memory variable
Psoftwere recovery Probability that the error in a
memory variable is treated as
"noise" by the software
and
PSEU
= Probability that an SEU occurs
within a given mission time
then
P(SYSTEM FAILURE) = PSEU * (l-Pg,t e level recovery)
* (l--Pregister level recovery) * (l-Psoftware recovery)
In order to evaluate the above expression, it is necessary to
obtain each of the required probabilities. PSEU can be obtained
from the literature (such as [31]), from experiments, or circuit
level modeling. The remaining probabilities can be obtained by
gate level and functional level simulation for a particular
hardware/software combination. Each of these parameters will now
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be examined in detail.
Measuring Pgate Levelrecovery
To measure the probability of gate level recovery, one can
simulate the processor and peripheral hardware at the gate level,
and inject transient faults. To do this in a meaningful manner,
one must:
- define a mix of faults characteristic of the radiation
environment to be studied,
- define the software to be executed on the processor, and
- define recovery within the processor.
The fault mix is a function of the type of SEU contemplated.
If nuclear radiation effects are to be studied, the probability of
a fault at any particular gate is a function of the gate density on
the chip where that gate exists. In the absence of density data
for a particular chip, one can assume that faults are equally
likely to occur at any gate within the chip.
Lightning may also cause random effects across the chip due to
electromagnetic radiation within the box. In an aircraft composed
of composite materials, ship's wiring will pick up the lightning as
EMI and transmit it to the processor via the processor's input
connectors. Power lines can be filtered as they enter the box;
however, radiation may be emitted from that portion of the input
line prior to the filter. Feedthrough capacitors and chassis
mounted line filters can help this situation; the amount of EMI
emitted in any particular design must be measured for a particular
hardware design. Signal lines cannot be filtered in the same
manner as power supply lines, as this would obliterate the signal
information. For lightning and other EMI sources, it is more
likely that faults will originate on input or output gates than on
gates located well within the processor.
A fault mix can be generated based on the above fault scenario
descriptions.
It would be desirable to simulate the actual program the CPU
will be executing to measure its characteristics. However, this
would be too time consuming. Therefore, a small sample (about
fifty) of the typical mix of instructions will be executed with a
typical data mix. The mix can be obtained by measuring program
execution (counting instructions, sampling data, etc.) in an
unfailed environment.
Recovery of the processor is defined as no fault propagating
to a register or latch. Should a fault propagate to a register,
the register and its contents will be recorded for use in the next
simulation phase.
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To reiterate, the methodology for measuring recovery at the
gate level is:
- choose a fault model and probability distribution,
- simulate about 50 instructions of program execution for each
fault, and
- record the faults that never reach a register Or latch, and
which register or latch the remaining faults reach.
GGLOSS is a tool that can efficiently perform the above
simulation tasks. The Stevens version of GGLOSScan run as a
deductive simulator, yielding the required information in a timely
manner.
Once the data is collected, a few assumptions are necessary
for the final probability calculation. One must assume the number
of clock cycles for which the fault exists. In the absence of
other information, it is assumed that a fault is equally likely to
occur at any time during program execution.
Measuring Pregister tevet recovery
Register level recovery occurs when an error propagated to a
register does not affect program execution. For instance, an error
in the AX register of a microprocessor may occur just prior to that
register being loaded with a constant value; - the previous
(erroneous) value of the register is ignored, and the program
executes correctly.
Gate level simulation data will predict what registers will
contain errors due to an SEU. In order for the program to execute
incorrectly, this error must propagate to memory (or a system
output; the system outputs are usually memory mapped), or cause a
program jump incorrectly. A register transfer level (or functional
level) simulation of the processing complex can be used to measure
the probability that the error propagates to affect program
execution.
A register transfer level simulator will be used because:
- RTL simulators are simpler and require significantly less time
to run, and
- a significant number of instructions must be simulated to obtain
meaningful data.
A significant subset of the instructions should be simulated (~ 500
- 5000 instructions) depending on the software itself.
The output of the level of simulation should include:
- the probability that the error propagates to memory, and
142
- the probability that the error causes an extraneous jump.
Again, it is assumed that the SEU could occur at any time
during execution.
Measuring Psoftwarerecovery
Should a memory variable be affected, the processor might
still recover if the error is treated as noise by the processor.
Each variable takes on a specific set of values during normal
operation; if the error causes a variable to take on a value within
this range, it may only show up as a noise point, and the system
will recover.
On the other hand, if the variable takes on a value well
outside of its operating range, the software may not function
correctly.
Using the software validation methodology described previously
[32], the validated operating range of each variable is available
for comparison with that value created by the error. It is assumed
that:
- If the error causes a variable to take on values within its
operating range, then the system will recover.
If the error causes a variable to take on values outside its
operating range, this region of operation was never validated,
and the system will fail.
By simulating the control program, instrumented for validation as
in [32], the necessary probabilities can be calculated. It is also
assumed that the error has an equal probability of occurring at any
instant in time. Using this, an overall probability can be
calculated.
Computing P(SYSTEM FAILURE)
The probability of system failure of a multiplex of processors
is a function of the system architecture. With an architecture in
mind, some description of the failure scenario must be made. One
possible failure scenario is the following:
- all processors incur a simultaneous SEU
- the SEU affects each processor in a different manner
- majority voting is used
Then, if the architecture is an n-plex:
P(SYSTEM FAILURE) = PSEU * [ (l-Pgat e feverrecovery)
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* (1-Pregister level recovery ) * (1-Psoftware r_overy)] (n-l) 2
Other expressions can be derived for other architectures and other
failure scenarios.
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8. CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE WORK
It was concluded that simulation is a viable means for
validating both hardware and software and associating a reliability
number with each. This is useful in determining the overall
probability of system failure of an embedded processor unit, and
improving both the code and the hardware where necessary to meet
reliability requirements. The methodologies were proved using some
simple programs, and simple hardware models.
It would be desirable to test the GGLOSS methodology on more
sophisticated hardware and more complex software. More
specifically,
- Use GGLOSS to simulate a complete processing channel of a
triplex or quad system,
- Simulate an actual OFP to surmise its latency characteristics,
- Estimate its probability of failure under the appropriate Markov
model.
It would be desirable to test the software reliability
methodology on a more complex OFP, and to demonstrate high
reliability software (Probability of failure on the order of 10"9).
It would be desirable to combine the methodologies to obtain
results on the reactions of these processing systems to SEUs.
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Appendix I. GGLOSS Users Manual
The Current Stevens Institute version of GGLOSS has been
changed significantly from previous versions. These changes were
made to achieve the following:
- make Stevens GGLOSS easier to use, more reliable, and easier to
modify in the future, and
- add the capability of building a large simulation from modules
representing components or partitions.
The resultant GGLOSS program has been tested by creating a
partitioned version of the toy microprocessor, assembling a
simulator, running it, and comparing the results with results
obtained using the toy processor modeled under previous versions.
GGLOSS no longer prompts the user with a series of questions
to decide on how to build the simulator. Rather, the main GGLOSS
program has been rewritten to act as a command processor. This
means that users may either type in interactively, or prepare a
command file, of different functions that they would like GGLOSS to
perform, along with parameters that either choose options or supply
optional values. Only in certain instances (where it was deemed
desirable) does GGLOSS prompt the user to enter data.
To run GGLOSS, type in (or set up a command file with)
R GGLOSS
The program will respond with its prompt
GGLOSS>
and wait for its first command. There are five different commands
supported:
COMPILE
BIND
FLTGEN
MEMORY
INCLUDE
In addition a blank line may be entered (which will be ignored) and
comments may be entered by starting the line with !. The command
END
will terminate the program.
Each command may be entered with optional parameters following
it. Parameters are separated by a comma, and some parameters have
an equal sign followed by data. If a command and its parameters
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cannot fit on a single line, a dash (-) is used to indicate that
the command is continued on the next line. However, each parameter
must be completed on a single line. In the following command
description, lower case letters represent parameters to be replaced
by appropriate names while upper case letters represent parameters
to be entered as shown.
GGLOSS COMMANDS
Examining each command in detail, along with its parameters:
COMPILEfilename,FAULT,IN=COMMON,IN=PARAMETERS,ICS,TABLE=tablefile
This command translates a single SDL file into an executable
module. The parameters mean:
filename
- the (complete) name of the SDL file
FAULT signals the translating modules to compile a
faulted module. If this parameter is omitted, the
resulting module is true value (or fault free).
IN=COMMON \
IN=PARAMETERS/
indicates whether the input pins for the module
should be passed by subroutine parameter, or in
common. If omitted, this parameter defaults to
PARAMETER. It should be noted that PARAMETER is
the only suitable method for inputting to a chip
used in multiple places in the hierarchy; however,
with PARAMETER, the user is limited to 64 pins.
COMMON has no limitation as to the number of pins,
and is meant for situations where the board has
been partitioned, and there will be only one caller
of the module.
ICS indicates that the module contains initial
conditions to be applied at the beginning of the
simulation. If this parameter appears on the
command line, the user will be prompted to supply
the initial conditions by pin and value. It must
be noted that initial conditions should not be
specified for modules that are called from more
than one location in the hierarchy, as this will
cause problems in the present implementation.
TABLE=tablefile - indicates a file containing the failure rate of
the gates involved in the module. If omitted, this
defaults to GDAT:FAILURE.DAT. However, its
inclusion allows different modules to be described
with different failure statistics for each gate
contained therein.
BIND modulename,REPEAT=nn,PRINT,INTERMIT,CYCLES=nn,FLT/MACH=nn,
RECDET=nn
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This command takes information from previous compiles, and
builds the "rest" of the simulator, including the control program,
etc. The parameters are:
modulename
- the name of the module (module names are given
between colons after the word EXT) of the highest
level module in the hierarchy.
REPEAT=nn
- the number of times to repeat the simulation for
each set of faults. GGLOSS allows the user to
simulate inputs using a dataset, and, when this
option is used, it is desirable to repeat each
faulted run with a different input. This parameter
tells how many different values are in the dataset
for each input. If this parameter is omitted, it
defaults to one.
PRINT
- prints a hexadecimal list of the system output
variables after each cycle for debugging purposes.
If omitted, no printout is produced.
INTERMIT
- it is desired to run intermittent faults. If
omitted, faults are assumed solid. If included,
the user is prompted for characteristics of the
intermittent faults.
CYCLES=nn
- the number of clock cycles to run each simulation.
This parameter should not be omitted.
FLT/MACH=nn
- the number of faults per machine. This defaults to
one, although it is possible to run multiple faults
in each machine using this parameter.
RECDET=nn
- the number of detections to print (If all fault
detections are printed out, the volume of paper
may become excessive in large simulations). This
parameter defaults to 5.
FLTGEN PIN=nn,RAM=nn,ROM=nn
This command generates random faults for the simulation using
Monte-Carlo techniques based on the failure rate statistics of the
module. The parameters are:
PIN=nn
- the number of pin faults to inject. GGLOSS chooses
nn faults randomly, based on the failure rate of
each gate, across the entire faulted portion of the
simulation.
RAM=nn
- the number of RAM faults to inject. GGLOSS chooses
nn faults randomly across all words in scratchpad
memory which have been indicated as faultable using
the MEMORY command. It then chooses a bit randomly
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across the word, and also chooses whether that bit
should be stuck at one or zero.
ROM=nn
- the number of RAM faults to inject. GGLOSS chooses
nn faults randomly across all words in read only
memory which have been indicated as faultable using
the MEMORY command. It then chooses a bit randomly
across the word, and inverts that bit to fault it.
MEMORYmodname,TYPE=PROM,TYPE=RAM,ADDBITS=nn,DATABITS=nn, IO=INPUT,
IO=OUTPUT,COMMON,INIT=filename,DIFF=nn,STARTADD=nn,LENGTH=nn,
FAULT
This command generates a table within GGLOSS to handle the
different memory chips that could be used to comprise PROM and RAM.
It can also be used to model memory mapped I/O. The parameters
are:
modname
- the name of the memory chip. This must be the same
as the name of the chip given in the partslist
description. To facilitate building complex
functional memories, multiple MEMORY statements may
refer to the same name.
TYPE=PROM \ - indicates whether the chip is PROM or RAM (default
TYPE=RAM / is PROM).
ADDBITS=nn - the number of address bits for the chip.
DATABITS=nn - the number of data bits for the chip.
IO=INPUT \
IO=OUTPUT /
- for memory mapped IO, indicates whether input or
output. Note that the inclusion of one of these
two parameters identifies the chip as memory mapped
IO.
COMMON
- indicates that the memory is shared among more than
one simulated processor, using adjacent machines in
the VAX parallel simulation word.
INIT=filename - file containing data for PROM or initialization
code for RAM
DIFF=nn
- for multiprocessor simulation using shared memory
(see COMMON above), the number of processors sharing
the memory.
STARTADD=nn
- the starting address in memory that should be
simulated for memory chips too large to simulate the
entire chip.
LENGTH=nn
- the size of memory that should be simulated for
memory chips too large to simulate the entire chip.
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FAULT
- this memory chip should be faulted when using the
ROM or RAM (as appropriate) parameter on the FLTGEN
command.
INCLUDE modulenm
This command lets GGLOSS know about previously compiled
modules that may be used to build hierarchically larger structures
without recompiling that module. It does this by reading in a
dataset produced at compilation time containing relevant
information about the module that would be needed for linking with
other modules. The parameters are:
modulenm - the name of the module. Note that this is not a
dataset name but rather a name included in the SDL
file EXT field to identify the module.
EN___D
This command terminates the GGLOSS program returning control
to VMS.
PROGRAMMING WITH GGLOSS
To successfully build a simulator using GGLOSS, it is first
necessary to construct datasets describing the digital system. A
separate SDL file describes each module. At the beginning of the
SDL file, the name of the module is included in the EXT statement
between two colons, i.e.,
EXT:modname: pinl,pin2,etc.
Other modules refer to it by this name. In addition to the SDL
files, the following files are necessary to assemble the simulator:
- a file containing the failure rates of each of the gates and
submodules in the module. This file is in 'free' format (one does
not have to adhere to columns, space or commas are delimiters) and
uses the following line for gate primitives:
gatenm, failurerate
where
gatenm is the generic name of the gate as indicated in
the SDL file TYPE statements, and
failurerate is the failure rate of the gate multiplied by
i0,*i0,
and for submodules, the file line is:
modnm
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where
modnm is the name of the module.
The failure rate of a submodule is obtained from previous
assemblies of that module if either the module was compiled in this
GGLOSSexecution, or an INCLUDE statement for the module is given.
If the failure rate file is called GDAT:FAILURE.DAT, its name
does not have to be included in each module compilation as this is
the default name.
- It is suggested that when a new simulator is built, a VMS
command file be constructed with the necessary GGLOSSstatements.
Certain options obtain their data by prompting the user, and when
this data is sizeable, it is easier to place it in a command file.
The data that must be entered by prompting is:
o initial conditions,
o intermittent fault data,
o print titles, and
o system inputs.
Note that system inputs may no lonqer be entered usinq a separate
dataset, as was allowable under previous versions.
RUNNING THE GGLOSS PROGRAM
A GGLOSS simulation is built using a two-step process:
1 - The GGLOSS program is run as outlined in the above sections.
The COMPILE commands produce the required BLISS modules
representing modules in the digital system. The BIND command
produces other required BLISS and FORTRAN modules, and also a
command file named BLDSIM.COM. BLDSIM.COM contains VMS commands to
compile and link the language modules into an executable simulator.
2 - The command file BLSDIM.COM is edited, if desired, and then
executed. BLDSIM.COM will always contain enough commands to
recompile every module in the simulation, link them, and then run
the resulting simulator. BLISS compilation time is lengthy, and
there will be cases when BLISS compiled versions of the modules are
already available. Editing can result in a time efficient solution
to this problem.
As an example of using GGLOSS, the following command file is
used to create a simulation of the toy microprocessor:
$R GLOSS
COMPILE GDAT:JEANXI.SDL,FAULT
COMPILE GDAT:JEANX2.SDL, FAULT
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COMPILE GDAT:JEANX3.SDL, FAULT
COMPILE GDAT:JEANXT.SDL, FAULT,TABLE=GDAT:TOYFAIL.DAT
MEMORY RAM,TYPE=PROM,ADDBITS=6,DATABITS=8,INIT=GDAT:TOY.MEM,FAULT
BIND TOY,CYCLES=I00
*
*
*
*
1
0
0
1
Y
2
1
1
1
0
FLTGEN PIN=200,RAM=20
END
The first three COMPILE statements create three partitions of
the toy processor called TOYALU,TOYADR,TOYCNT. The last compile is
the highest level description of the toy, called TOY, that properly
connects and invokes the previous three. Note that it uses a
different failure rate file, which contains the names of the
modules which TOY invokes.
The MEMORY statement gives the name of the chip used in the
SDL description as RAM and describes its address and data length.
It also names a dataset containing the program, and says the memory
can be faulted.
The BIND statement indicates that the name of the main module
is TOY (this is the module name, not the dataset name). It also
indicates that the program will run for i00 clock cycles.
Following lines indicate answers to questions about column headings
and input values, as per their respective prompts.
The FLTGEN generates 200 pin level faults at random, and 20
RAM faults at random.
If after running the simulator, one were interested in
injecting another 300 faults, it is not necessary to reconstruct
the simulator. Rather, a file of the form:
$R GLOSS
INCLUDE TOY
FLTGEN PIN=300
END
would generate a new fault file. The old simulator could be run
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again by entering
$R gsim:EXE
and it would use the new fault file.
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GGLOSS datasets
GGLOSS requires many datasets to obtain all the information
required to put together the simulation. Some of the required
datasets have been listed in detail in previous reports. An
overview of the datasets required is listed here:
LIBRARY.DAT A description of the gates used in GGLOSS
RTNES.R32
PARTSLIST
BLISS macros corresponding to the gates used in
GGLOSS
Description of the circuit
MEMORY.DAT Data to be entered in ROM or RAM. The first line of
the memory dataset has been changed to be:
LODMEM,HIDMEM,LRWMEM,HIWMEM,ENDPC,WMEMBS,LOIOOT,HIIOOT,LOIOIN,
HIIOIN,LOCOM,HICOM,NODM
where
LODMEM
HIDMEM
LRWMEM
HIWMEM
ENDPC
WMEMBS
LOIOOT
HIIOOT
LOIOIN
HIIOIN
LOCOM
HICOM
NODM
- Low address of Read Only Memory
- High address of Read Only Memory
- Low address of writable memory (RAM)
- High address of writable memory (RAM)
- Program ending address (not presently used)
- Address of stack segment (not presently used)
- Low address of memory mapped output (within RAM)
- High address of memory mapped output (within RAM)
- Low address of memory mapped input (within RAM)
- High address of memory mapped input (within RAM)
- Low address of common area (within RAM)
- High address of common area (within RAM)
- Number of different processors in complex
The remaining lines contain the data to be stored in ROM, repeated
NODM times. Each set of ROM data ends with an END statement.
INPUTS.DAT A list of input values for memory mapped input
encoded as one on a line in the order they will be requested by the
simulated processor's program. No check is made to insure that the
proper memory mapped address was entered; this mechanism works
solely on the order of request at the present time.
FAILURE.DAT Contains the failure rates of each component for use
in randomly choosing failures. The format of each line of the
dataset is:
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TYPE,RATE,NUMBER
where
TYPE
RATE
NUMBER
- Type of gate as listed in the partslist
- Failure rate of the gate scaled times 101°
- Number of gates of this type in the circuit
ROM FAULT FILE A file containing the addresses ranges of ROM to
generate random ROM faults in. It contains one line with two
numbers separated by commas listing the starting and ending
addresses.
RAM FAULT FILE A file containing a list of RAM faults.
are in the following format:
The lines
ADDRESS, BIT, 1 OR 0
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